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  • Title: Radical Psychology: A Journal of Psychology, Politics, and Radicalism
    Descriptive info: .. Radical Psychology.. A Journal of Psychology, Politics, and Radicalism.. Current Issue.. Mothering on the Margins.. Previous Issues:.. Special Issue on Girlhood.. Gender and Bodily Difference.. Winter 2008.. |.. Summer 2008.. Spring 2007.. Winter 2006.. Winter 2005.. Spring 2005.. Spring 2002.. Fall 2001.. Spring 2001.. Fall 1999.. Summer 1999.. Mission Statement.. Style Guidlines.. About The Editors.. A Journal of the:.. Radical Psychology is an international journal that uses a blind peer review process..

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  • Title: Radical Psychology: A Journal of Psychology, Politics, and Radicalism
    Descriptive info: Issue 2, Volume Seven.. Editiorial.. Brenda A.. LeFrançois.. Theorizing distress: Critical Reflections on Bi-polar and Borderline.. Christina Martens.. Stranger neighbours.. Helen Douglas.. Making Bipolar Britney: Proliferating psychiatric diagnoses through tabloid media.. Jijian Voronka.. A "Patient-Centred" Path towards Ignoring Patient Rights.. Rob Wipond.. We all go astray.. Leon Redler.. Governance through Psychiatrization: Seroquel and the New Prison Order.. Jennifer M.. Kilty.. Journal Page.. Style.. Editors.. Mission.. |.. Contact.. RadPsyNet.. org..

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  • Title: Radical Psychology: A Journal of Psychology, Politics, and Radicalism
    Descriptive info: 2008, Volume Seven.. Post Vietnam Syndrome: National Identity, War, and the Politics of Humiliation.. Myra Mendible.. Community Participation in Developing Primary Prevention Programs to Enhance Community Well-Being.. Jean-Marc Bélanger.. Madness or Illness?.. Jason Bernard Claxton.. Psychiatric Slave No More: Parallels to a Black Liberation Psychology.. Lauren J.. Tenney.. The Psychotic  ...   Trials.. Diana Semmelhack and Larry Ende.. Mere and Divine Madness: Bush, Schreber and the Contexts of Insanity.. Mark S.. Roberts.. Struggling Against Psychiatry’s Human Rights Violations: An Antipsychiatry perspective.. Don Weitz.. “ ‘Are You Sure, Sweetheart, That You Want to Be Well?’ ”: An Exploration Of The Neurodiversity Movement.. Kathyrn Boundy..

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  • Title: Radical Psychology Journal Mission
    Descriptive info: Radical Psychology Journal.. is a journal of the.. Radical Psychology Network.. and fully endorses its goals:.. The Radical Psychology Network seeks like-minded psychologists and others to help create a society better able to meet human needs and bring about social justice.. We want to change society's unacceptable status quo and bring about a better world.. And we want to change the status quo of psychology, too.. We challenge psychology's traditional focus on minor reform, because enhancing human welfare demands fundamental social change instead.. Moreover, psychology itself  ...   "radical".. We believe that our diversity is our strength; no single approach to psychology has a monopoly on the truth nor exclusive claim to the term "radical".. provides a forum for scholars interested in social justice and the betterment of human welfare but dissatisfied with the manner in which mainstream psychology has addressed these issues.. Subjects addressed by the journal include, but are not limited to: anti-psychiatry, qualitative methods, political psychology, feminism, anti-racism, multiculturalism, radical clinical theory, critical theory, critiques of mainstream psychology, and history of psychology..

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  • Title: Radical Psychology Journal Style Guidelines
    Descriptive info: Style Guidelines.. Style.. uses.. APA style.. The following exceptions are made:.. The use of gender neutral constructions such as s/he, (s)he, and he/she are actively encouraged.. The term "subject" is allowed in non-experimental works.. The use of footnotes and endnotes is encouraged.. Preparing Manuscripts.. Manuscripts should be prepared as single spaced documents with a single carriage return between paragraphs and no tabs.. Manuscripts can be sent (in order of preference) Word Perfect, Word, Rich Text Format, Plain Text with Line Breaks, or Plain Text.. If you are using plain text please include formatting direction in the text itself for example: [begin paragraph] [begin italics] [end italics] [center].. Submitting Manuscripts.. Manuscripts submitted to the following address:  ...   longer review periods.. Images.. Illustrations, photos, figures, charts and diagrams can be in either in JPEG or GIF format.. Please indicate where you would like the image to placed in the document by using the following format [place Fig1.. jpg about here centered].. The file name should match the name indicated in the text.. Please include any special formatting instructions (e.. g.. , centered, left - , or right- justified) in the brackets as well.. Images may be altered to reduce file size.. Note:.. Whenever possible, refer to online sources rather than paper sources.. Links to relevant online resources:.. APA style online.. http://owl.. english.. purdue.. edu/owl/resource/560/01/.. http://www.. apastyle.. org/elecref.. html.. http://otel.. uis.. edu/yoder/apastyle.. htm.. tamu-commerce.. edu/library/cit..

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  • Title: Radical Psychology Editors
    Descriptive info: Guest Editor of the Special Issue on Gender and Bodily Difference.. Carla Rice.. is Associate Professor in Women’s Studies at Trent University where she lectures in culture, health, and psychology.. A leader in the field of body image within Canada, she is a founding member and former director of innovative initiatives such as the National Eating Disorder Information Centre and the Body Image Project at Women’s College Hospital in Toronto.. Her research explores representations and life history narratives of body and identity.. Cover Artist.. Tanya Workman.. is a multimedia producer, visual journalist, writer and editor based in Toronto.. The cover photo was part of Envisioning New Meanings of Disability and Difference, a project that showcases photographs and digital stories created by women living with disabilities and physical differences.. Brenda LeFrançois.. is a critical psychologist and faculty member in the social work department at Laurentian University.. Editorial Board.. Shlomit Schuster.. is a philosopher and an independent scholar and lecturer.. Michael McCubbin.. is a researcher at Laval University, Quebec.. He serves as  ...   Sourthern Israel.. He was international director of the Psychology Department Project at the University of Prishtina, Kosova, from 2001 to 2006 and a clinical consultant to the WHO Roma-Askali-Egyptian psychosocial project in Mitrovica, Kosova.. He reports that he is addicted to his bicycle but not for sport.. Rhonda Love.. is a psychologist and a professor is the Department of Public Health Sciences, University of Toronto.. Tod Sloan.. is Chair of Counseling Psychology at Lewis and Clark College in Portland, Oregon.. He is the author of Life Choices (Westview, 1996) and Damaged Life (Routledge, 1996).. He edited the collection Critical Psychology: Voices for Change (Macmillan, 2000).. His primary interests are in psychoanalysis and critical social theory.. Eleni Hatzidimitriadoui.. is a lecturer in Community Care at the Tizard Center, UKC.. Louis N.. Sandowsky.. is presently based in London, England where he works as a freelance writer and editor in association with Haifa University and Middlesex University.. He was a Teaching and Research Fellow for the Department of Philosophy at Haifa University from 1999-2003..

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  • Title: Editorial
    Descriptive info: Volume Seven, Issue 2.. Editorial.. This special issue of Radical Psychology is comprised of texts based on presentations given at the Madness, Citizenship Social Justice: A Human Rights Conference held at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver from June 12-15, 2008.. This conference brought together a lively group of over 200 academics, survivors/service users, activists, artists, researchers and mental health professionals.. Participants came from as far as New Zealand, Australia, the UK, South Africa and the USA to join Canadian participants in addressing the issues of civil liberties, recovery, ‘sanism’, discrimination and oppression, amongst others.. This original conference, organised by Robert Menzies, included an inspired four days of not only paper presentations but also art exhibitions, theatre and film presentations.. [1] The conference website can be viewed at.. sfu.. ca/madcitizenship-conference/.. The first article “Theorizing Distress: Critical Reflections on Bi-polar and Borderline”, written by Christina Martens, reviews and critiques different theoretical understandings of distress, including the bio-medical model, anti-psychiatry, critical psychiatry, social constructionism and performativity.. These understandings are linked to the labels of “bi-polar” and “borderline” (the BPDs), along with a political examination of the performance of citizenship and it’s denial to those deemed both dependent and distressed.. In the second article “Stranger Neighbours”, Helen Douglas highlights three stories of madness and resistance during the South African apartheid.. The interplay of the concepts of citizenship, social justice, inclusion\exclusion and identity are considered within these three narratives, along with an analysis of Levinas’ ethics of justice for the Other.. This context and analysis forms the backdrop for an important application to the current ‘treatment’ of the ‘mad neighbour’ in society.. The third article “Making Bipolar Britney: Proliferating Psychiatric Diagnoses Through Tabloid  ...   civil rights of Canadian mental health patients in the Kirby Report.. The report claims to recommend a more patient-centred approach to mental health care however Wipond’s analysis demonstrates that the report itself refuses to take a patient-centred approach.. Within this critical analysis of the Kirby report, the underlying assumptions and biases that are antithetical not only to the civil rights of patients but also to employing an empowering patient-centred approach to mental health treatment and care are detailed.. Fifth, the article entitled “We All Go Astray”, written by Leon Redler, an apprentice of RD Laing, re-looks at the core principles of the Philadelphia Association as well as Levinas’ concept of the Other in order to draw together an original and radical approach to understanding and responding to madness.. Our cover art is part of Sue Clark-Wittenberg’s ad campaign to end electroshock (ECT).. We believe it provides a powerful image\text that speaks volumes on the topic of disability rights, feminism and anti-psychiatry in one brief glimpse.. [2].. [1] The conference was hosted by the Simon Fraser University Institute for the Humanities.. Funding for this conference was generously received from both the SFU Institute for the Humanities as well as from the SSHRC program: Aid to Research Workshops and Conferences in Canada.. Dr.. Robert Menzies, the J.. S.. Woodsworth Resident Scholar, organised the conference.. [2] Sue Clark-Wittenberg is an antipsychiatry and anti-electroshock activist speaker who lives in Ottawa, Canada.. She received the Coalition Against Psychiatirc Assault (CAPA)'s award for "Lifetime Antipsychiatry Activism" in September 2008.. You can read Sue's story at her webiste: suzyo.. wordpress.. com Sue is also the Director of the International Campaign to Ban Electroshock (ICBE) icbe.. com..

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  • Title: Theorizing distress: Critical Reflections on Bi-polar and Borderline
    Descriptive info: Christina Martens [.. *.. ].. Not the least, psychiatry is appealing because it masks.. the necessarily evaluative dimension of its activities behind.. a screen of scientific objectivity and neutrality.. It was and is.. therefore, of great potential value in legitimising and depoliticising.. efforts to regulate social life and keep the recalcitrant and.. socially disruptive in line.. Andrew Scull (As cited in.. Becker, 1997.. ).. The most solitary of afflictions.. In its very character as performative resides the.. possibility of contesting its reified status.. (.. Butler, 1988.. , p.. 520).. Judith Butler.. Performative Acts and Gender Constitution.. Introduction.. It is undeniable that people experience distress.. How both the nature of the distress and the experience of it come to be understood is contingent on multiple factors including social, cultural, economic, gender, and spatial conditions of the time in which it is theorized.. The discourses, practices and technologies that support and naturalize particular meanings of distress shift through time and place acquiring and losing meaning.. During the 19th century, then again during the mid and later 20th century, the concept of “true” insanity, understood as mental “illness”, was conceptualised as biochemical, corporeal and etiologically explainable (.. Horowitz 2002.. ;.. Hacking 1995.. ), while “moral” insanity has, until the late 20th century, been identified as a moral disorder of behaviour reflecting the social maladjustment of the individual (.. Busfield 2002.. Micale 1995.. Historically “bi-polar” (or manic-depression as it was once known), along with “schizophrenia”, was considered true “insanity”, while “borderline” grew out of conceptualisations of hysteria (.. ), psychopathology (.. Lunbeck 1994.. ) and moral insanity (.. Interestingly though, both were originally viewed as somatic difficulties and it wasn’t until the late 19th century that psychical processes were even considered as the seat of the distress (see for example.. Micale, 1995.. Through the processes of disciplinary creation of both psychiatry and social work (see.. Figert 1996.. ), western conceptions of distress moved to define more substantially the behaviours, processes, and treatment ideologies that identify “illness” in order to create a “psychiatry of the everyday” (.. 46).. This psychiatry, with its desire to be viewed as a medical specialty, introduces “mental health” as a conceptual tool to define, regiment, and control social performances of distress (.. Under this medicalized gaze, behaviours of everyday living increasingly come to be evaluated and judged, creating a new category of persons not mentally ill but neither mentally healthy (.. As distress comes to be understood through the ever more specific discourses of psychiatric illness/disorder, the practices of psychiatry have increasingly focused on the administration of populations, subjects and the restoration of the subject’s “capacity to cope” (.. Rose 1996.. 12).. The blurring of boundaries between illness and behaviour, between normal and abnormal, “true” and “moral” gains momentum during this time of significant economic, societal and cultural change and psychiatry as a discipline struggles between a dynamic inclusion of the “normal” in its gaze, and a diagnostic discipline seeking to reinvest itself with the legitimised mantel of science (.. Socially, it is also a time when “personality comes to predominate over discourses of character” (White and Hunt, 2000, 101), a predominance predicated on the shifting emphasis from socio-moral priorities, that is a focus on maintaining the individual’s moral obligations to the society within which s/he lives, to autonomist, individualist striving that values personal “growth” and accomplishment.. Moving from a character base that focuses on one’s social conformity, a personality-driven social structure emphasises “the quest for a unique self” (.. White and Hunt, 2000.. 95).. Within this shifting social structure, many conceptualisations of distress are theorized.. Some locate distress within social relations and expectations (.. Frank 1995.. ), some see them as resistance or complete adherence to engendered norms that are incommensurate with individual being (.. Gremillion 2003.. ), some as punitive action because of a refusal to adhere to these same norms (Showalter as cited in.. 76), while others, mostly from the medical field, locate the distress in the individual as a “malfunctioning brain” (.. 7).. And while particular conceptualisations predominate over others during certain historical periods, understanding distress remains open to a critical theorising that foregrounds the historicized and normative nature of its object of view.. This is a critical theorisation that recognises its criticisms come from “the ideals and tensions of the society itself” (.. Young 1990.. 6).. In this paper, I look at a variety of theoretical conceptualisations of “illness”, particularly “mental illness”, with a view to potentially using these conceptualisations to understand the further refined concepts of “bi-polar disorder” and “borderline personality disorder”.. Following Butler, I use the concepts of “bipolar” and “borderline” (the BPDs) in quotation marks, not to make them appear any less real or negate the distress of the individual performing such things, but to trouble the naturalization of these concepts in western culture (Butler as cited in.. Butler and Scott 1992.. In addition, for the remainder of this paper I do not use the term “disorder” in conjunction with “bipolar” and “borderline” as the term is loaded with particular values and a modernist view about a “world that ought to be orderly” (.. 17).. I hope that through this troubling of the assumptions of cultural thought around the BPDs I can work on the “limits of what is thinkable, extend those limits and enhance the contestability of what we take to be natural, inevitable about our current ways of relating to ourselves” (.. 2) and others.. Beginning with the a look at the relations between illness and citizenship in order to frame my thinking, I then try to tease apart several ways of looking at illness including biomedical concepts and their critics, social constructionist, feminist, Foucauldian, and postmodernist theorisations in order to understand the range of thought given to distress.. This slow movement allows an investigation of whether a theorisation of distress as performance, one premised on neo-liberal notions of the “good” citizen, allows a critical re-thinking of hegemonic and naturalized notions of “mental ill health” (.. White and Hunt 2000.. 45).. Illness, Behaviour and Citizenship.. Viewing the changing interpretation of behaviour through the technologies of the “psy” sciences, conceptualisations of distress highlight a historical shift from badness, immorality, or delinquency to psychiatric disturbance (Busfield as cited in.. Bendelow 2002.. 156) and link strongly to changing notions of citizenship in contemporary thinking (.. Fraser 1989.. This shift in thinking from bad to mad to incompentent or dependent remains a moral valuation through the separation of illness from behaviour (.. Akiskal 2003.. ) and determines whether or not “citizenship” and its benefits are bestowed on individuals (.. 54).. Stoppard (in Ussher 1997) points out that, western cultures have increasingly come to value interiorized emotionality over a more expressive and external emotionality.. This move to a social preference of an interiority of emotion coincides both temporally and conceptually with changing notions of citizenship and the conflation of these two contextual pieces opens a space for the consideration of distress, particularly as identified by the BPDs, as a performance engaged within the constraints, obligations, rights and responsibilities of the neo-liberal citizen.. Rose (.. 1989.. :.. 1999.. ) demonstrates that citizenship within “advanced” liberalist societies is performative, a set of repeated and stylised acts of “free but responsibilized choice in a variety of private, corporate, and quasi-public practices” (p.. xxiii), one that engages the “citizen” in the continual self-work that ensures that “life is to become a continuous economic capitalization of the self” (.. 161).. This citizen performs as the independent, autonomous and risk-assessing entrepreneur.. Rose describes this citizen performing their obligations of consumption and self-mastery within a governing teleology that emphasises the inculcation of acceptable ways of performing within a market-driven culture.. Consumerist action becomes naturalized as a notion of freedom and the idea of citizen changes from historical member of community with the ability to exercise political power and the obtaining of civil rights to one of an independent individual exercising freedom through the economic market-place (Rose.. 124; see also.. Laurie and Bondi 2005.. , 5-6).. The idea and determination of dependence, as anti-thesis to this active entrepreneurial and consumerist citizen, then, becomes one mechanism through which these citizenship ideals can be denied (.. Young (.. 1990.. ), while extrapolating a “politics of difference”, reveals that liberal citizenship theories deny citizenship to those individuals the reigning culture deems as having questionable reason or those who are not seen as independent (p.. As “[d]ependence in our society…implies, as it has in all liberal societies, a sufficient warrant to suspend basic rights to privacy, respect and individual choice” (p.. 54) Young suggests that the exclusionary practice of denial of citizenship hides in contemporary notions of health.. White and Hunt (.. 2000.. ) explicate a notion of citizenship predicated on a neo-liberal context that values autonomy, independence, and engagement with market driven ideals of risk taking.. This context naturalizes self-government as a practice of care of the self, and thus as a practice of freedom.. The ethical practice of care of the self in addition to a concern over the conduct of others “influences the extent to which individuals are recognized to be competent members of a political community and, thus, citizens” (p.. Intimately tied to notions of freedom and linked to a relational model of governing, the actions sought through various performances are both self-governing and other-governing but are understood through normative frameworks (.. Hunt 1999.. Underlying conceptualisations of these performances are moral notions that involve normative judgements.. For example, manipulative performances by individuals linked to the BPDs are pathologized and often punished while similar performances enacted within the sphere of the market-economy and that lead to an increase in financial benefit are not.. Thus discourses of economic participation are embedded in the definition of dependency but are masked by the strong language of health and illness.. This different perception may lie in the assignment of dependence (illness) but is also a fundamental link back to the constitutive, performative nature of distress.. In faint echoes of Szasz's (.. 1960.. ) criticism of the moral yet unaddressed nature of psychiatry, Hunt (.. ) notes that “moralizing discourses are frequently linked with other discursive components such as concern with national decline and with individual and collective health” (p.. 14), and reveals that moral regulation movements are increasingly and disproportionately existing within discourses of health (p.. 3).. The determinancy of dependency through the discourse of health as a moral movement appears sufficient and necessary to the negation of citizenship through a performance of distress.. In contrast to a concept of citizenship that prefers a particular ideal of care of the self, Orsini (.. 2005.. ) discusses a notion of biological citizenship through which individuals form political identities as a partial resistance to the “official knowledge” (p.. 1) of health.. These personal, contested notions of biological citizenry provide some way to view, with a lessening pessimism over the apparent inescapability of it all, a way to affect agency from within a prevailing ontological and epistemological discourse.. As a way of revealing the power structures inherent in the discourses of health that deny citizenship, these resistances show how citizenry is both “a powerful instrument for reinforcing or altering particular programmes of competing political interests” (.. Fierlbeck 1991.. 3) and a way of challenging it.. Biological citizenry, according to Rose and Novas (.. 2004.. , cited in Orsini), enables individuals to frame their health demands as political while maintaining their identity as citizens of the society within which they perform.. This conceptualisation of citizenry is active and participatory, and links politics to individual “biological destiny” (.. Orsini 2005.. 11).. In direct contrast to a neo-liberal, market-driven citizenry engaged in the practices of care of the self within a consumerist frame, biological citizenry uses the body as the foundation upon which political demands are made and active citizenry is housed.. Taking on what appears as a solely materialist attitude, biological citizenry “changes…how citizens construct their citizenship duties or obligations” (.. Orsini, 2005.. 31) through the implication of the body, ill or otherwise, as a politicised experience.. Unfortunately, as Orsini notes, the focus on the body runs the risk of masking or negating the social context through which this experience is made understandable and thus runs the risk of neglecting systemic social inequalities.. Biological citizenship appears, then, to accept a universalised notion of the “healthy” body thus creating spaces for communities of “ill” bodies to coalesce and form political collectives.. Unlike Moss and Dyck’s (.. 2003.. ) conceptual triangulation of body, mind, and space, which moves the gaze outward from the individual onto the social, biological citizenship reifies the location of distress in the individual body while challenging the social and moral underpinnings of determinations of citizenship rights and obligations.. A performative conceptualisation of distress provides a stage upon which the context of the good citizen, and its inculcation and reiteration through the mechanisms of dominant psychiatric discourses, plays out.. People performing “bipolar” or “borderline” destabilize ideas of being and knowing but in differing ways.. “Borderline” challenges dominant social norms for economic participation (inability to keep a job, home etc.. ), self-government (emotional lability), bodily care (as in the case of self-mutilation), and relational/familial expectations (history of stormy relationships), while “bipolar” traverses the extremes of energy.. Some of these traverses are viewed in a positive light (for example the extraordinary ability to work excessive hours on little sleep, being the “life” of the party etc.. ), while others such as the total removal of oneself from the social arena in depression (see for e.. Healy 2006.. Simmie and Nunes 2002.. ) are pathologized.. This stage and the performances that it displays are, however, conceived in many different ways.. These ways, or conceptual frameworks, are what I move on to next in order to tease apart ideas of distress and how they may express define, or maintain, implicitly or explicitly, neo-liberal ideas of citizenry.. Biomedical Concepts and their Critics.. Of the many conceptual positions that are used to theorize distress, biomedically-based psychiatry currently occupies the hegemonic position (.. Double 2002.. In bio-medical theories, including bio-psychiatry, the physical body is the primary site of investigation.. While its role in both the constitution and social acceptance of normative criteria for determining the healthy or ill body is not unproblematic (see for example.. Dale 2005.. ), this anatomical conceptualisation of illness emphasizes an observed deviation from a medically-devised understanding of the structural integrity of the body (.. Szasz 1974.. 210) and places the location of the “illness” within the body (.. Lorber and Moore, 2002.. 2).. Western cultures have naturalized this conceptualisation as value-free science.. The critically contested nature of these concepts, concurrent criticisms of the value-free status of science and the negation of the experience of those so distressed, tend to have little impact on the practice of psychiatry (.. Wilson and Beresford 2002.. Current understandings of distress located within the bio-medical (often called neo-Kraepelian) framework focus predominantly on the biological brain, as is evidenced by theories of “chemical imbalance” as the causal feature for mental illness (.. This particular framing of distress satisfies an aetiological urge (chemical imbalance), identifies a biological site of the “structural” failing in the brain, and provides an ameliorative treatment (typically pharmaceuticals).. Through a prescriptive process, it legitimises the experience of individuals in distress by naming their experience within a socially accessible grid of intelligibility and by providing a solution.. Seeking out cause, prognosis, and cure within the physical anatomy (hormones, genes, chemicals, etc.. ) of the individual through tests and palpable signs, the bio-medical discourse maintains the modernist, positivist view that scientific methods are objective and can ultimately lead to a universalizable truth (.. Thomas and Bracken 2004.. Critics of this particular framing of distress are typically placed in three camps: anti-psychiatry, critical psychiatry, and increasingly, post-psychiatry.. Thomas Szasz, the outspoken psychiatrist of the anti-psychiatry camp, states that mental illness is a “myth, and that the psychiatric “creation” of “mental illness” as a medical concern required a change to the definition of “illness”.. He claims that to “the established criterion of alteration of.. bodily structure.. was now added the fresh criterion of alteration to.. bodily function.. ” (.. ,p.. 12 emphasis original).. As bodily structure was an anatomical observation, behavioural observations required a shift in medical thinking in order for those observations to be considered within the health/illness paradigm.. Szasz’s claim that because a “symptom” or “behaviour” is evaluated within a particular social context, the term “illness”, as a structural failing of the anatomical body, does not apply.. That is, the norms from which the individual deviates are behavioural thus they are socially, not biologically, determined (.. 201) and as such bio-psychiatry had to redefine the term “illness” to make mental distress fit.. Instead of theorizing distress as illness, Szasz defines the behaviours as indicative of “problems with living” (.. Identified through a label of mental “illness”, “problems with living” do not refer to the structural integrity of the human body but are, for Szasz, deviations from social, legal and ethical norms.. In writing against psychiatry’s disciplinary reliance on psychodynamic methodologies while claiming the anatomical concept of illness [.. 1.. ], Szasz [.. 2.. ] criticises a psychiatry that both denies its companionship with linguistics, in that it works in the world of signs and signifiers through the investigation of “sign-using human behaviours” (.. 1974.. 4) while at the same time claiming companionship with medicine through its search for bodily cause and structural failing.. Szasz classified psychiatry as a “theoretical science” studying personal behaviour (p.. 8) and, as such, dealt with moral, not physical, issues.. His revelation that the moral foundation of psychiatry becomes shrouded by the use of anatomical implications highlights the adaptive nature of the discipline.. He claims that obscuring the individual’s “problems with living” by calling it “mental illness” has served to distract the discipline’s attention away from the “essentially moral and political nature of the phenomenon” (p.. 25) while highlighting the individual response to it.. Biomedicine’s positivism dismisses the qualitative aspects of problems with living, preferring “scientific” methodologies and the norming (or quantifying) of “health” as the pre-eminent goal.. While the “anti-psychiatry” movement was evident mostly in the 1960’s and 70’s, current critical examinations of psychiatric thinking, processes, and assumptions are labelled (or claim the label) critical psychiatry or post-psychiatry.. The goal of critical psychiatry is to avoid the polarization of the psy/anti-psy movements while attempting to engage practicing psychiatrists in an examination of several foundational aspects of bio-psychiatry: first that the modernist set of assumptions on which bio-psychiatry is based, the “nature of mind, meaning, and knowledge” (.. 368) are not universal truths but instead theoretical conceptualisations imbued with social and historical signification; second, that individuals in distress and governments who typically pay for services are demanding more input into the nature and content of psychiatric services including an expansion of the narrow focus on anatomical concerns; third, that the experiences of individuals in distress have inherent value and their expertise and should be engaged; and finally, that both corporate desire to control the mechanisms and responses (i.. e.. pharmaceutical interventions) to perceived ill-health and the coercive tendencies of psychiatry should be monitored and managed.. 368).. This current conceptualisation does not challenge the illness designation as had Szasz but instead accepts this critical foundational stone and tries to mediate the nature of the power/knowledge relationships within the “psy” disciplines.. Through the inclusion of individuals and their experience, critical psychiatry manages at once to recognize the socially and historically constituted nature of the definitions of “illness” while at the same time obscuring the naturalized nature of the term.. It both challenges and reinforces the idea that what individuals experience is illness, and as such appears to contest the foundations of biological psychiatry as hegemonic.. While it operationalises a different power/knowledge relationship between individual and psychiatry, it maintains the naturalized ideal of mental “health” vs.. mental “illness” and engages individuals to do the same (.. While anti-psychiatry is, today, largely dismissed within  ...   and identify individuals as sick, thus in need of state intervention.. These same mechanisms also reinforce the “need” to gain a label to be considered legitimately in need of assistance in order to attend to other materially important aspects of life such as income and treatment.. While depoliticising the context within which people experience distress, JAT apparatuses maintain a strong focus on the individual as citizen and act fundamentally in the naturalization of self-governing tendencies within populations.. Performing Bi-Polar, Performing Borderline.. Distress may, at any one time, be seen as biochemical, socially constructed, a response to socialised oppression, or an effect of discursive technologies.. These all insist on a reified notion of distress seldom questioning the politico-cultural assumptions embedded within the idea of distress itself.. In order to tease out those politico-cultural assumptions, another conceptualisation lends itself to our understanding -- that of distress as performance.. Micale (.. ) explains that distress can be viewed, and is viewed by many non-medical scholars, as a ‘sort of social communication in the social language of the bodily symptom” (p.. 112).. Distress in this sense forces illness out of the realm of strictly medical understandings and onto a cultural stage.. Using the example of Madame Bovary, Micale demonstrates how cultural discourses come to mirror medical discourses and how these cultural discourses shift social practices to naturalize the site of instability as within the individual.. This representational reaffirmation of a particular theorisation of distress serves a political purpose: it elaborates certain experiences as legitimate distress while implying a set of assumptions about what it means to be distressed (.. In attempting to problematise the taken-for-granted nature that gender holds in much traditional theorising, Butler (.. 1988.. 1993.. ) elaborates a theory of gender as performance that produces, reproduces and maintains the very construct it performs (.. 525).. This theorisation proves helpful in our consideration of distress.. In her conceptualisation of gender as performance, Butler explains, first, that performance is constitutive of the individual who performs (.. 24).. This understanding, that an individual not only performs certain ways of being but is constituted by that performance denaturalises gender from a reliance on the physical body and an identification of female or male biology.. Second, that what is said about gender (gendered discourses) constitutes how it is performed (.. This second point argues that discursive mechanisms structure what is performed, how it is performed and understood, and how performances that outlie the framework are identified and responded to.. Third, these performances form a regulatory practice (.. , pp.. 31-2;.. 1) from which the response is predicated and enacted.. Butler also insists that the performative constitution of gender acts on the surface of the body and not on some “essence” of being (.. 140); that the performance of gender is not some essential aspect of biology but instead a construction that requires specific ways of being in society.. And finally, that gender is performative in the sense that it fabricates an identity that must be reaffirmed through future performances in a “stylised repetition of acts” (.. 140).. For Butler (.. ) performance is temporal, collective, not inconsequential to the culture, and has the strategic aim of maintaining the normative notions underlying its binaristic structure (p.. 526).. Through this conceptualisation of gender as performative, she is able to denaturalise a concept and understand its constructed and enacted character.. By deflecting the “essence” of gender from the body to the discourses and practices that constitute its social expression, Butler provides us with a new way to view distress, as performative and not as some illness or behavioural process.. Especially helpful is her claim that while gender is performative and constructed in and through that performance, she is in no way asserting that it is illusory or in some way “not real” (.. 32).. If we consider distress as a performative act, one that becomes defined, in our case, as “bi-polar” or “borderline”, through time and strategic normalizing, then the inscription of disordered distress through these particular labels can be distanced from some modernist ideal of mental health.. We see how the performative imperative of distress both constitutes the individual, so performing, as distressed, while at the same time constituting the distress categories with which certain performances are defined.. Butler’s notion of performativity and its constitutive nature are clarified further as “not a singular or deliberate ‘act’, but, rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names” (.. The performance of distress and the discourses that name and legitimise such performances are constituted and constitutive of the other.. This notion of performativity does however bring up the idea of agency.. The challenge of the agency of the individual is deflected through an understanding of gender performances as not some kind of closet from which one “chooses” which gender to be today nor some imposition upon the individual (.. Butler 1988.. 526) but instead the performance is an inter-relation between “text and interpretation.. in a culturally restricted corporeal space [in which the gendered body] enacts interpretation within the confines of already existing directives” (p.. Distress as performance is indicative of embedded relationships among “bodies in context” in specific arrangements of the deployment of power” (.. 53), and arrangements between the individual and society formed, mediated, and defined by the discourses available.. These performances, constitutive though they may be of a particular conceptualisation of distress, act on the surface of the body akin to gender performances, and are not indicative of some essential core that is pathological.. Conceptualising distress as a constitutive performative act escapes a reductionist and bleak descent into perpetual conflict with society by viewing the performance instead as “a struggle to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility” (Butler 1993, 3).. That is, by viewing distress as a performance, hegemonic conceptualisations become open to examination.. Not only are ideas of biology and social construction to be considered legitimate units of analysis but critical reflection on the very basis of the concepts is necessary.. The idea that distress is understood through a highly politicised process geared towards the naturalisation of one concept over another (.. 2) and that these politics “constitute the contemporary field of power” (p.. 5) validates the political as a field for the examination of distress.. In performing “bi-polar”, actions and behaviours are seen as “out of the control” of the individual.. These acts are explained through a variety of causal, etiological, or traumatic rationales and therefore labelled as “illness”.. The pathologizing criteria are conceptualised as incapacity to regulate emotional states, of moving through the extremes of emotional poles.. Thus, labelled as ill, the performer is disengaged from her societal expectations to perform in a certain way.. The highly political desire for moderated and internalised emotion are not investigated as impacting the performer or the evaluation of the performance.. In performances of “borderline”, the pathologizing criteria are not typically viewed as affective (that is biological) but as defective adaptation strategies.. These strategies are identified through economic, relational, or self-governing behaviours such as unstable relationships, unstable work histories, suicidality, self-harming, or unstable exteriorised emotions.. Whereas behaviour in “bi-polar” is seen as an outcome of affective problems, affective problems in “borderline” are seen as the outcome of behaviour.. Normalization ensures that “the perception that other ways of being in the body are pathological…because they do not represent a tightly controlled system” (Birke as cited in.. 43; also see.. ; and.. 11 for a discussion of “ugly bodies”).. Certain levels of “self-control” and “discipline” are expectations.. In a very material sense, individuals are obliged to be “healthy”.. For both “borderline” and “bipolar”, the expected ways of shaping their bodies, and the performances of distress are unexpected, disconcerting, and consistently challenge the status quo of power/knowledge relationships In effect, they challenge at a political level the very conceptualisation of distress.. A Politics of Distress.. Butler (.. ) states that the “transformation of social relations becomes a matter…of transforming hegemonic social conditions rather than the individual acts that are spawned by those conditions” (p.. A politics of distress conceptualises the performance of “bipolar” and “borderline” within the realm of debate on what is a citizen in order to redirect our critical gaze away from the individual in performance onto the social conditions within which these performances are enacted.. As seen in scholarly and personal histories of distress (see for example.. ), particular performances are labelled, relabelled, resisted, and discarded.. This continual fluctuation reveals the “undesignatable field” (Butler as cited in.. 16) that constitutes performances of distress and problematizes a desire for universalizable and totalizable categories to define them.. Moss and Dyck (.. ) explain that, in looking at women’s ill bodies, “the materiality of the body shifts unpredictably and changes the relationship between what the body can do and be and the expectations of what the body can do and be” (.. 84).. Following this thinking, we can further refine a politics of distress as not so much.. what.. the body can do and be but.. how.. the body does and is.. This.. requires an interpretive stage upon which the act is publicised.. By conceptualising distress as.. the embodied subject performs certain social relations compared to.. it is expected to perform, we realize that the interpretation of these performances as “bipolar” or “borderline” reveals the disciplinary, social and political forces at work producing a normalized view of mental “health” as rational performance.. These performances are constitutive of and constituted by the evaluations of the behaviour.. These evaluations are the workings of power/knowledge.. The definition and legitimisation of the categorising and defining of distress as ultimately a mechanism for social control is evident in the study of many “illnesses” (see.. Lorber and Moore 2002.. Davidson 2008.. ) but it must be remembered that these conceptualisations, as Bordo (1995) points out, can be reversed and seen as a way of investigating what is wrong with a culture.. The relational nature of power inherent in performances of distress is exposed through the diffusion of distress as merely an individual, symptomatic act, into a diverse, intermingled framework including the individual, the discursive, and the social.. My effort in this paper has been to critically reflect on conceptualisations of distress within a “politics [that] does not seek to regiment individuals according to a totalitarian system of norms, but to de-normalize and de-individualize through a multiplicity of new, collective arrangements of power” (Seem in.. Deleuze and Guattari.. 1983, p.. xxi) thus revealing performances of “bi-polar” and “borderline” as political acts.. A growing politics of distress explodes constructed boundaries revealing a permeable and shifting membrane between the individual and the social.. As Foucault claims however, all ideas are dangerous and this conceptualisation is no less so for wanting to incorporate embodied experience and discursive constructions as both political and performative.. In “bipolar” and “borderline” tensions between the individual as self and the individual as social entity are as much embodied for the individual as embedded in the complex social relations within which they navigate.. The conceptualisation of distress performances as “bipolar” or “borderline”, are evaluated through elaborate cultural systems of understanding.. A politics of distress identifies the implications on self-identity of particular ways of theorising that distress (be it biomedical, social constructionist, feminist etc.. ) while foregrounding their social contingency.. Relocating the performance of distress to the intersection of cultural discourse and the subject as a neo-liberal citizen shifts the consideration of these performances to a broader stage, considers the context within which the conflation of illness and behaviour in biopsychiatry becomes not only possible but desirable, all the while resisting the cultural tendency to seek individualized and totalized explanations for performances of distress.. References.. Akiskal, H.. (2004).. Demystifying borderline personality: Critique of the concept and unorthodox reflections on its natural kinship with the bipolar spectrum.. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavia.. , 110, 401-407.. (Guest Editorial).. (2003).. Demystifying borderline personality: The Cyclothymic-Bipolar II Connection.. Medscape.. Paper presented at the American Psychiatric Association's 156th Annual Conference, June 2003.. Last accessed 22 Dec 2005 http: www.. medscape.. com/viewarticle/457151.. Becker, D.. (1997).. Through the looking glass: Women and borderline personality disorder.. Colorado: Westview Press.. Bendelow, G.. (Ed.. ) (2002).. Women, Health and Healing: The Public/Private Divide.. London: Routledge.. Birke, L.. (2002).. Anchoring the head: The disappearing (biological) body.. In Gillian Bendelow (Ed.. Bickenbach, J.. (1999).. Minority rights or universal participation: The politics of disablement.. In Jones, Melinda, and Basser Marks, Lee Ann.. Disability, divers-ability, and legal change.. The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.. pp.. 101-115.. Busfield, J.. The Archaeology of psychiatric disorder: Gender disorders of thought, emotion, and behaviour.. ).. 144-162.. Butler, J.. (1988).. Performative acts and gender consitution: An essay in phenomenology and feminist theory.. Theatre Journal.. , 40, 4, 519-531.. (1990).. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity.. New York: Routledge.. (1992).. Contingent foundations: Feminisms and the question of the “postmodernism.. ” In Judith Butler and Joan W.. Scott.. (Eds.. ).. Feminists Theorize the Political.. and Scott, J.. (1993).. Bodies that Matter: On the discursive limits of ‘sex’.. New York: London; Routledge.. Bordo, S.. Feminist skepticism and the “Maleness” of philosophy.. In Sharlene Hesse-Biber, Sharlene, Christina Gilmartin, and Robin Lydenberg, Robin (Eds.. Feminist Approaches to theory and methodology: An interdisciplinary reader.. New York: Oxford University Press.. Pp.. 29-44.. Connell, R.. W.. (1987).. Gender and Power.. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.. Dale Stone, S.. (2005).. Resisting an Illness Label: Disability, impairment and illness.. In Moss, Pamela and Teghtsoonian, Kathy (Eds.. Conteing Illness: Processes and practices.. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.. 201-217.. Davidson, J.. (2008).. More labels than a jam jar.. Contesting Illness: Processes and Practices.. pp 239-258.. Deleuze, G.. and Guattari, F.. (1983).. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and schizophrenia.. Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press.. Double, D.. The limits of psychiatry.. British Medical Journal, 324, 900-904.. Dreyfus, H.. and Rabinow, P.. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics.. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.. Dumit, J.. (2006).. Illnesses you have to fight to get: Facts as forces in uncertain, emergent illnesses.. Social Science and Medicine.. , 62(3), 577-590.. Fee, D.. ) (2000).. Pathology and the Postmodern: Mental illness as discourse and experience.. London: Sage Publications.. Fierlbeck, K.. (1991).. Redefining Responsibility: The Politics of Citizenship in the United Kingdom.. 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Durham, NC: Duke University Press.. Hacking, I.. Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory.. Princeton: Princeton University Press.. Healy, D.. The latest mania: Selling Bipolar Disorder.. PLOS Medicine.. , 3, 4, 0441-0444.. Horowitz, A.. Creating mental illness.. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.. Hunt, A.. Governing Morals: A social history of moral regulation.. Cambridge Univ.. Press.. Jones, M.. , Basser M.. , and Lee, A.. Disabilty, divers-ability and legal change.. The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nihjoff Publishers.. Laurie, N.. and Bondi L.. Working the spaces of Neoliberalism: Activism, Professionalisation and Incorporation.. Blackwell Publishing.. 5-6.. Lorber, J.. and Moore, L.. J.. Gender and the Social Construction of Illness.. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press.. Lunbeck, E.. (1994).. The Psychiatric Persuasion: Knowledge, gender and power in Modern America.. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.. Magill, C.. The boundary between borderline personality disorder and bipolar disorder: Current concepts and challenges.. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry.. 49, 8, 551-556.. McLaren, M.. Feminism, Foucault, and embodied subjectivity.. New York: State University of New York Press.. McWhorter, L.. Practicing, practising.. In Taylor, Dianna Taylor Vintges, Karen (Eds.. Feminism and the Final Foucault.. University of Illinois Press,143 - 162.. Micale, M.. Approaching Hysteria: Disease and its interpretations.. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.. Millon, T.. (with Roger D.. Davis) (1996).. Disorders of Personality: DSM IV and Beyond 2nd ed.. New York: John Wiley and Sons.. Moss, P.. and Dyck, I.. Women, Body, Illness.. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.. Mouffe, C.. Feminism, citizenship, and radical democratic politics.. In Butler, Judith, Scott, Joan W.. Feminists theorize the political.. NewYork; London: Routledge.. Citizenship and social identity.. The Identity Question.. , 61, 28-32.. Orisini, M.. Hepatitis C and the dawn of biological citizenship: Unravelling the policy implications.. Conteing Illness: Processes and Practices.. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 107-122.. Price, B.. , Adams, R.. and Coyle, J.. (2000).. Neurology and psychiatry: Closing the great divide.. Neurology, 54 (1), 8.. Rose, N.. Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self.. 2nd.. ed.. London/New York: Free Association Books.. Psychiatry as a political science: Advanced liberalism and the administration of risk.. History of the Human Sciences.. , 9(2), 1-23.. (1998).. Inventing ourselves: Psychology, power and personhood.. Advanced Liberalism.. Powers of freedom: Retraining political thought.. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.. and Novas, C.. Biological citizenship.. In Aihwa Ong and Stephen J.. Collier (Eds.. Global assemblages: Technology, politics and ethics.. London: Blackwell.. 439-363).. Sawicki, J.. Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, power and the body.. New York, London: Routledge.. Scull, A.. The most solitary of afflictions: Madness and society in Britain.. In Becker, Dana.. Seem, M.. In Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.. Simmie, S.. and Nunes, J.. The last taboo: A survival guide to mental health in Canada.. Toronto; McClelland and Stewart.. Stoppard, J.. Women’s bodies, women’s lives, and depression: Towards a reconciliation of material and discursive acts.. In Jane M.. Ussher.. Body Talk: The material and discursive regulation of sexuality, madness and reproduction.. 10-32.. Understanding Depression: Feminist Social Constructionist Approaches.. New York and London: Routledge.. Stone, S.. Resisting an illness label in Pamela Moss and Katherine Teghtsoonian, (Eds.. ),.. Szasz, T.. (1960).. The myth of mental illness.. American Psychologist.. 15, 113-118.. Szasz T.. (1974).. The Myth of Mental Illness.. Revised Edition.. Harper and Row.. Thomas, P.. and Bracken, P.. Critical practice in psychiatry.. Advances in Psychistric Treatment.. , 10, 361-370.. Ussher, J.. Body Talk: The Material and Discursive Regulation of Sexuality, Madness and Reproduction.. Women’s madness: A material-discursive-intrapsychic approach.. In Dwight Fee (Ed.. White, M.. and Hunt, A.. Citizenship: Care of the self, character and personality.. Citizenship Studies.. , 4, 2, 93-116.. Wilson, A.. and Beresford, P.. Madness, distress and postmodernity: Putting the record straight.. In Marian Corker and Tom Shakespeare (Eds.. Disabiltiy/Postmodernity: Embodying Disability Theory.. London: Continuum.. Wirth-Causton, J.. Women and borderline personality disorder: Symptoms and stories.. New Brunswick, New Jersey, London: Rutgers University Press.. Young, I.. ustice and the Politics of Difference.. Notes.. [.. 1] Although Szasz is writing during a time of shift from psychodynamic to biomedical psychiatry, Price et.. al.. (2000) show that this is not the first shift of its kind to happen within the discipline and that the movement between biological to social (ie.. Psychodynamic) back to biological then to an amalgam of the biological/social has a long history within the field.. For an alternative view of the shifting of priorities in psychiatry, see Lunbeck ( 1994).. 2] Szasz in fact was vociferously critiqued after the publication of The Myth of Mental Illness.. In the Preface to the Second Edition, he reveals that calls for his dismissal from his university position because “he did not believe in mental illness” (vii).. Biographical note.. Christina Martens has a Masters degree in Community Rehabilitation and Disability Studies from the University of Calgary.. She is currently attempting to theorize a “politics of distress”.. In her working life, she is the Executive Director of two branches of the Canadian Mental Health Association on Vancouver Island..

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  • Title: Stranger neighbours
    Descriptive info: The writing of this paper has been animated by three small stories of resistance and madness from the South African liberation struggle.. Ghost stories, I suppose.. They’ve haunted me for years.. The first is set in a farmhouse in the north of the country in the late 1980s.. It had been rented by four or five young white South Africans, members of a small sabotage unit of Umkhonto weSizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC).. One morning, one of the men left the house, walked to the local police station and turned himself in, leading to the arrest and imprisonment of himself and his comrades.. Years later, the unit’s commander wrote in his own memoirs that this fellow had become “increasingly paranoid”, that he had “apparently disintegrated as a personality”.. As if that was enough to say, as if it was simply a psychological flaw, and nothing to do with him.. The second is a conversation I overheard a few years ago while waiting for an ANC meeting to begin.. One man asked another if he had seen “Johnny” lately.. The second man said, “No.. I hear he just sits in his garage all day.. Drinking.. ” The first man shook his head.. “Man, they must really have fucked him up.. ” The second man replied softly, “Ja, they really did.. ” They paused, a moment of helplessness and regret, and then began to speak of other things.. As if there was something that prevented them from going to that broken comrade, something that made it impossible to offer him comfort.. The third is the story of a woman who, with her husband, kept a safe house in Johannesburg for more than three years.. The whole time she lived on edge, afraid of being caught, but even more afraid of not being equal to the task.. Finally, she slipped off the edge, fell to pieces.. When democracy finally was won, she found herself unable to attend the election celebrations.. As if her lack of confidence had marked her as unworthy.. Three stories, unable to rest, struggling towards meaning.. A meaning that strangely begins to surface in a discourse on “Madness, citizenship and social justice”, the odd constellation that brought 250 people together in Vancouver in 2008.. What is it that these three concepts share? What is at stake and what is at their root? I think it might be identity, the identity of persons; more exactly, about who we are with others.. And so, the first question for me is not about madness or social justice.. It’s citizenship, which deploys identity as a force to be reckoned with, as if force and reckoning were called for.. As citizens, we are democrats, inheritors of a lineage of Western political thought that embraces both the rationality of the Enlightenment and the republican ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity.. Autonomous, we have no kings or masters over us.. Bearing rights, under the figure of Justice with her balance and her blindfold, we are each, regardless of the conditions of our birth, warranted equal access to the public goods of the commonwealth.. In fellowship, we acknowledge our obligations to respect and to protect our sisters and brothers.. From the first, citizenship is concerned with justice in human community, with sociality, with how you and I are to get on together.. Citizenship signifies as inclusion: being counted in and being held accountable.. The City (the democratic state and its bureaucracy) needs to keep tabs on us citizens.. This isn’t necessarily sinister, or even a bad thing.. Our official ID documents our political and personal rights and freedoms.. For the City is always also a gated community, its boundaries necessary both to administer its own population and to defend against outsiders.. Often this amounts to the same thing: the original Greek city-states are generally understood as self-defence units.. The laager of South African apartheid, a defensive circling of wagons in dangerous and alien surrounds, tells the same story.. Inside is us, recognisably; out there is them, not-us, strange and unfamiliar, of whom we may be wary.. We love our neighbours as we love ourselves -- although, in this view, that’s a tautology: our neighbours are ourselves.. 3.. One thing I know for sure, though: there is more to me than what the City takes me for.. Who I am in the world is a constant negotiation.. I may identify as or with something, such as citizenship, but I am not identical with it.. I might even assume a false identity, but only at the risk of lessening myself.. And if I am mis-identified and mis-taken by others, I could be lost entirely.. Which is to say that there is a correspondence or an affinity between me and my identity -- between who and what I am -- that is not simply contingent.. That is, it’s not only contingent, and it’s not simple.. It has something to do with sincerity, in claiming and proclaiming my experience of worldly things, but also something to do with others and their claims on me.. The stories they tell of me.. 4.. And who are you, my neighbour? We both hope for, at least, a nicely symmetrical neighbourly relationship in which each will each look out for the other without interfering in each other’s privacy, without asking too much.. Good neighbours calling across our good fences.. Accommodating each other.. This is the usual (Western liberal) story about community: individuals -- rational agents maximising their interests -- who voluntarily join together, identify with each other as a group.. The many become one.. Neighbours in a neighbourhood, with national variations: the American “melting pot”, the Canadian “mosaic”, South African “unity in diversity”.. As all of us neighbours give up, for better or for worse, a portion of our autonomy to conform to the idea of our common citizenship, the community assumes a more or less recognisable and stable identity “of its own”.. We then identify ourselves with our community and our City, opening the possibility that the idea of it could take on a life of its own, like a monster or a golem.. The formation of community around identity always threatens to either harden into totalitarianism or to fragment and disintegrate.. There is an immeasurable potential for violence here.. One strategy to minimise this, if it worries us, is to unlatch the gate, allowing greater inclusions into our “us”.. Or, more accurately, to engage with groups of the non-enfranchised when they stake their own claims to citizenship, citing their exclusion as injustice.. Fighting precisely for the totality in the name of justice.. You cut us, they say.. Are we not bleeding? And because they are, after all, the same as us, they too should be loved as ourselves.. That we might become a more perfect union.. 5.. There is a dialectical logic here of identity, of sameness and difference, inclusion and exclusion.. But, equally clearly, this is not the complete creation story of a community that advances citizenship.. The Western liberal account of identity-based community is a naturalist one, and as such, provides for the equality of citizens.. This is a good thing.. But when faced with ethical issues, it falls victim to the old philosophical dilemma that naturalist descriptions don’t justify ethical norms, or that you can’t get from an “is” to an “ought”.. This is not so good.. And so, alongside the rational political story, we may also remember the ancient ones that speak of the Good of creation and the shame of the Fall, about loving our neighbours and our enemies, and about the hospitality that is due to strangers.. Morality plays whose lessons grow faint when the pure logic of identity beats in our blood.. 6.. To look for another origin of community and its reason, we can return to the question of who (rather than what) we are to each other: I, at home in the world, both unique and a player of various parts, and you, my neighbour.. As a citizen, you are my equal, my counterpart.. And you also overflow that identity, as someone strange and incomprehensible to me -- and yet, remarkably, not as an enemy, but someone who requires peace from me.. This is the strange (maybe strangely familiar) philosophical territory of Emmanuel Levinas, he who has said:.. With the appearance of the human -- and this is my entire philosophy -- there is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other.. That is unreasonable.. Man is an unreasonable animal.. Levinas, 1988.. 172).. The Other, for Levinas, is the stranger, the widow, the orphan; the one to whom I am obliged not because of our commonality, but because her alterity and vulnerability command me to responsibility.. As alterity, her difference is my non-indifference.. It is her uniqueness that I care for.. And this revelation of the Other immediately and simultaneously also opens all humanity to me, all the other others for and before whom I am also responsible and for whom justice is necessary.. Levinas calls this relatedness “ethics”, and it is this ethical imperative for justice for others that gives rise to consciousness, knowing, language and all the arts and sciences of human being -- including, of course, the foundation of community and the political conditions of citizenship.. The Other is my neighbour.. As Levinas describes it, this origin -- the appeal of the Other -- is ethical before it is ontological.. One comes to identity through responsibility rather than discovering one’s responsibility in identity.. Prior to consciousness, anachronistic to memory and intention, the appeal of the other person appears senseless and irrational to the logic of being and identity.. Thus consciousness can go on to discover itself as the centre of its world in self-consciousness, in a natural order of things.. Then, rather than welcoming, I close the door against these others who may pose a threat to my continued being.. What interrupts this, again, is ethics -- not as a moral code designed to curtail the excesses of ego, but being moved by direct sensible contact with the Face of the other, which puts my egoic self in question, which breaks open the heart again, and again introduces all humanity and the exigency for justice, and calls for consciousness.. Which again may begin to take itself too seriously, forgetting its immemorial obligation to all these strangers, my neighbours.. 7.. None of this makes a difference to what we have observed about identity, but it does change what it means and helps us to think both personal and communal identities differently, and otherwise.. When citizenship is understood to be founded in ethics prior to identity, it still espouses the ideals of reason and democracy in community, still draws a line around “us”, but,  ...   brigades who fought side by side with the Spanish republicans, or men who take up feminist struggle, are not necessarily dupes and useful idiots.. Nor are they saints.. In a revolutionary liberation movement, one’s capacity to contribute to the cause always surpasses (if it is even a function of) one’s identity as a member of one or another group.. True revolutionaries, when they struggle for their own liberation are always fighting as well for the liberation of others.. From the perspective of bourgeois individualism and the reason of self-interest, this is certainly difficult to fathom, but there is nothing new here.. It was formulated by Nelson Mandela as Your freedom and mine cannot be separated.. By John Donne as Any man’s death diminishes me, for I am involved in mankind.. In the bible as Peace, peace unto the neighbour and the one far off.. 11.. If resistance is the necessary remedy to oppression, then a failed or betrayed resistance is a disaster.. Indeed, Slavoj Žižek (as cited in.. Santner, 2005.. 89) claims that psychological symptoms are the signs of failed revolutionary attempts.. Santner continues:.. I am suggesting that symptoms register not only past failed revolutionary attempts but also, more modestly, past failures to respond to calls for action or even for empathy on behalf of those whose suffering belongs to the form of life of which one is a part.. Which brings us back to the three small disasters I have been trying to understand.. To be clear, I am not interested in the historical facts of the matter, or the “true story” of these people, most of whom I don’t know of at all beyond these simple narratives.. As a counselling philosopher, I am trying to get a sense of what they can tell us about love and revolution, and how it all can go wrong.. The recruit who turned himself in.. He would have known that the lifespan of a covert unit was limited.. Maybe it was just the suspense of waiting to be caught that tore him up.. Or maybe this is a story about how difficult it is to take up a struggle against one’s own people, in service of their declared enemies.. Black South Africans taking up arms against apartheid made all kinds of sense.. But white people who signed on were more or less leaving home, knowing full well they would be seen as traitors.. It took a different kind of courage, and it demanded a certain kind of comradeship and support.. One that cannot be secured by tales of self- and group-interest, but calls for a different understanding, such as I have attempted to sketch here.. I wonder what this man’s comrades did for him as he began to unravel.. I wonder why it wasn’t enough.. I am horrified by what he did.. Still, his “paranoia” and “disintegration” were not just his business.. Whatever led him out that morning, his commander was wrong to write out the context, to reduce it to individual pathology.. The account in the book -- and perhaps he did not write all that he felt -- is as dry as a report of broken equipment.. The whole unit, and not just the designated madman, had a problem.. The unit was the commander’s responsibility; those people were his responsibility.. The man who was fucked up.. This time, a coloured man arranges his own incarceration.. In the logic of apartheid, race was the key determinant of identity and destiny.. His liberation would entail escaping the cage of being “coloured” in the gaze of a racist state.. In political-historical terms, the task would be to overturn the regime and build a democratic non-racial South Africa.. On a personal level, to refuse what the system had in store for black people, to eradicate the self-hatred it tried to implant, to create another meaning for his life.. Above all, to begin to act as a free man.. Perhaps by joining his personal and political responsibilities as an activist in the struggle.. Armed struggle demands a particular discipline.. It can take the form of a heroic, romantic, cowboys-don’t-cry kind of code, a matter of virility, pride and honour.. This is what it is to be a comrade.. This is what it is to be a man.. But it is at the personal level that we find and lose ourselves, and to assume a personal identity defined by the political is as risky as assuming any other defined identity as oneself.. And then he was captured.. Maybe for him, this meant he was no longer a comrade -- and if he was not a comrade, then he must be, after all, what the regime tried to create him as.. Except that could not be true either.. His honour remains tied up with being a comrade.. He is, and is not.. He thinks himself to a standstill.. Except he’s wrong.. His friends were still concerned about him.. Yet he clings to his shame as the last remnant of the pride that has given his life and his sacrifice meaning, drinking toasts all day to the man he wanted to become, drowning his shameful drunken self.. There is a tight circle of reasoning in this, and perhaps his comrades don’t know how to break through it to find him and bring him back to himself.. Or maybe he was devastated by torture, by direct experience of the profound hatred with which one person can brutalise another.. After that catastrophe, only particular acts of particular care and creation -- only love, I think -- can restore one’s world and faith.. Maybe his comrades weren’t up for it.. Maybe they had demons of their own.. Maybe whoever was helping to keep him safe and alive in his garage was doing the best they could.. The freedom of a man can’t be seen to depend only upon a result.. It’s already in the struggle, which is in this sense messianic.. Freedom is the condition for the struggle for freedom.. We live our freedom daily when we are not bound by the orders of our various memberships, when we are responsible for ourselves and each other.. When we live in dignity, when we have faces.. When we each say I, and present ourselves.. Comrades get this wrong when brokenness is an embarrassment or a shame instead of tenderness, when the idea of being a comrade gets in the way of comradely solidarity.. The third story, of the safehouse-keeper who lost her edge, is also about assuming identity, in various senses.. Those who keep a secret refuge for the resistance within the City must maintain a double identity, each a mask for the other.. The teacher is secretly a revolutionary.. The revolutionary is really a teacher.. It demands a constantly self-monitoring consciousness that is at best stressful and at worst divisive or paralytic.. But in this case, she also believed that she was somehow insufficient.. Acting as if she was strong enough so that she might become strong enough added another twist to the masquerade, tracing the lines along which she eventually fell apart.. It seems to be another story of confusing the what-ness and the who-ness of identity.. What we are, our qualities, attributes and occupations -- any variable that completes the statement “I am x” -- is more or less multiple and adaptable.. Our uniqueness and singularity, our confidence and truth, is in who we are: the living I of experience, contact and desire.. Personal identity, carrying both of these, is also interpersonal.. We are who we are for others; we are what others make of us.. We need basic recognition.. And mistakes can be made, innocently or with malice.. We can certainly, as was this woman, be mistaken about ourselves.. 12.. Again, these are not meant to be “case studies”.. No doubt there were many factors that contributed to the madness of these comrades and their fractured revolutionary attempts.. But the narratives still indicate an interplay of citizenship, madness and social justice.. The identity-based City, which relies and insists upon the conformity of its citizens, calls for resistance in order to reduce its violence and to open a more hospitable space.. If the City is too tyrannical, too petrified, too split from its own roots, then revolution may be in order.. A risky business, both because of its own tendency to reification and violence and because of how devastating failure can be.. And we all know that history is full of revolutions that have eaten their own.. But these failures are neither certain nor complete.. What seems to me more interesting is that sometimes comrades and revolutionaries get it right, coming together with everything that that they (that we) are, in true society, with true discipline, bearing and depending upon each other in difficult times, each realising a responsibility for the liberation of all the others, of each other, of oneself.. Small events, perhaps, that nevertheless indicate an origin for our solidarity and our community that is prior to identity and the calculus of interest.. Biko, S.. (1978).. I Write What I Like.. Oxford: Heinemann.. Levinas, E.. Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other (M.. B.. Smith and B.. Harshav, trans.. ) London: Athlone Press.. (1981).. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (A.. Lingis, trans.. ) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.. Some thoughts on the philosophy of Hitlerism (1934).. In E.. Levinas, Unforeseen History (N.. Poller, trans.. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press.. The paradox of morality: An interview with Emmanuel Levinas (conducted by T.. Wright, P.. Hughes and A.. Ainley).. In R Bernasconi and D Wood (eds), The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.. Transcendence and Height (T.. Chanter, S.. Critchley, N.. Walker, A.. Peperzak, trans) in E.. Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings (A.. Peperzak, S.. Critchley and R.. Benasconi, Eds).. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.. Lingis, A.. (2007).. The First Person Singular.. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.. Santner, E.. L.. Miracles happen: Benjamin, Rozenzweig, Freud and the matter of the neighbor.. In S.. Žižek, E.. Santner and K.. Reinhard.. The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology.. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.. Note.. 1] The late 1980s were marked by increasingly violent repression and resistance in South Africa.. The ANC, as the leading organisation of the liberation movement, had been outlawed by the apartheid regime in 1960 and took up armed struggle the following year.. It has been the ruling party in South Africa since the democratic transition of 1994.. Helen Douglas is a philosopher with a counselling practice in Cape Town, South Africa (www.. philosophy-practice.. co.. za).. From 1987 to 1990, she and her husband Rob kept a safe house in Johannesburg for the ANC underground.. Her first book, Love and Arms: Violence and Justification after Levinas is forthcoming (Trivium Publications) in 2009..

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  • Title: Making Bipolar Britney
    Descriptive info: Making Bipolar Britney: Proliferating psychiatric diagnoses through tabloid media [.. Jijian Voronka [.. This article examines tabloid press representations of Britney Spears as a mentally ill subject, and is interested in how the project of ‘diagnosing bipolar Britney’ works towards solidifying biomedical conceptions of madness.. Through this work, I look at the ways images and text in 2008 tabloid presses have worked to disperse psy discipline knowledges to ‘lay’ tabloid readers.. I will show 1) the ways in which psychiatric expertise has been brought into the tabloid press in order to explain the story of Britney, and promote psychiatric understandings of madness.. 2) How information on signs and symptoms of mental illness have proliferated in tabloid text, and how this data can be used to psycho-socialize the lives of everyday readers.. 3) How the media monitoring through paparazzi photography of Britney’s life is similar to case file clinical monitoring.. I explore how these thematics work to teach the public through popular magazines the ‘proper’ ways to approach, treat, comply, struggle, and recover from mental illness.. In this way, the story of Britney through tabloid press has worked to teach readers the appropriate biomedical methods of how to ‘make sense’ of madness.. My interest in Britney Spears as a ‘mad’ subject started in winter 2007, with the cover of a particularly stunning National Enquirer.. The image of Britney, shaved head, rumpled shorts and wielding an umbrella, about to smash a paparazzi’s car window -- was stunning enough.. The headlines of “Britney in Mental Institution” was really icing on the cake.. I started to think about that cover, thoughts like “Britney (or Brit Brit, as the tabloids like to call her) will never end up in the bin: she’s too rich, too managed, too maintained.. ” I started thinking about how the media had shifted their coverage of her, how she had gone from a ‘bad’ to a ‘mad’ girl almost overnight.. During the 2006 holidays, while Britney was still blond, made-up, pantiless and partying -- she was still being understood as a ‘bad girl’.. But later, with her boldly shaven head, mini-skirt shed for gym teacher clothing, and brazenly pointed anger, she had transformed into a ‘mad girl.. ’ That shift, that reinterpretation of her actions from ‘risky’ (Late nights! Drugs! Out-of-control partying!) to ‘at risk’ (Suicide watch! Car crashes! Mental illness!) caught my attention.. Bemused, I started minding how Britney was being covered in the press: and started thinking about her as a subject of interest, situated, as she suddenly was, at the precarious nexus of femininity, motherhood, iconic embodiment and madness.. If the personal is political, if fat is a feminist issue, if the medium is the message, if discourse matters: then the storied account of Britney’s ‘descent into madness’ matters.. Granted, the figurehead of Brit Brit as academic subject is easily dismissible as ‘cultural studies lite’.. But I contend that the coverage of Britney’s journey -- from good Christian Southern virgin, to uncertain wife and mother, to late-night Hollywood divorcee excess, to certifiable mental patient -- can tell us a lot about how the intersectionalities of race, class, gender, sexuality and ability play out in popular culture.. Much could be said about Britney as a cultural icon: what she means to America, how she has had an impact on our notions of femininity (or how our notions of femininity have dictated her), how her particular small-town Louisiana Whiteness is played out in the entertainment arena, how her becoming a mother and wife disrupted that trajectory.. But my focus will concentrate specifically on the tabloid press coverage of Britney in 2008, the year that she shifted from bad girl to mad girl.. Through this paper, I want to show what Britney’s transformation through the popular press - into a young girl suffering with mental illness - means to the social.. Specifically, how ‘the case’ of Britney has worked to transform and spread psy discipline models of understanding madness into the tabloid press.. And how that dissemination of psychiatric knowledge in lay magazines has worked to ‘spread the word’ about medical models of mental illness: working to circulate signs, symptoms, and cures to readers, and targeting an audience that has hitherto found little exposure to expert psychiatric discourse in such pages.. The Britney case has invited psy commentary into such supermarket staples as.. Us Weekly.. and.. People Magazine.. to mental health professionals, and by doing so, dispersed mental health discourses to a younger and wider audience.. Confessions.. If there is a time to confess: this would be mine.. I am someone who is mad identified: I chose to identify myself as part of the ‘mad movement,’ a growing number of people who have been psychiatrized, but choose to work outside of dominant medical model understandings of ‘mental health’ and ‘mental illness.. ’ Instead, the mad movement embraces different ways of thinking and being, and places particular emphasis on the problematic ways that psychiatry and other psy discourses in particular, and social/medical systems in general, work to hinder mad peoples’ social inclusion.. To illustrate, I’ll draw on the work of Michel Foucault, who rather than seeing power “simply as a site of oppression, or as simply determining certain identities, [he] sees that it is in negotiation and play that identities are formed.. Foucault suggests that it is possible to construct what he calls counter-discourses and counter-identification, that is, individuals can take on board the stigmatized individualities that they have been assigned [in this case madness].. and revel in them rather than seeing them in negative terms.. ” (.. Mills, 2003.. 91).. Similar to the ways in which ‘queer’ or ‘dyke’ have been reclaimed in the LGBT community, mad pride is a way of celebrating difference and finding power in what is usually considered a problem.. My last confession will be this: I am someone who reads tabloid magazines.. It started a decade ago as an undergraduate, as a form of release from the grind of academic reading.. It is something that I continue to do today, as a PhD student.. There is a stigma attached to such endeavours, as if my purchasing power is in direct correlation to the decline of the Western Empire (so be it!).. I encountered this sentiment at the Madness, Citizenship and Social Justice conference held in Vancouver in June of 2008, when I gave a presentation on this subject, entitled “Bipolar Britney: Spear(s)heading diagnosis through media monitoring.. ” I drew heavily on images of Britney in the tabloid press, and during Q A was confronted with my own implication in contributing to the process of ‘celebrity-mania’ by purchasing such ‘low-culture’ magazines.. Princess Diana, of course, came up.. As I draw heavily on such magazines for this article, I want to address this issue.. I refuse to feel shamed for buying, reading, or enjoying these magazines.. With a critical eye, they allow me to understand dominant narratives on beauty, the body, the American dream.. They teach me how my always-evolving subjectivity as a White, now thirty-something, educated, financially precarious mad woman is being read in dominant cultures.. I use them not only for pleasure, but also as a way of querying what is happening ‘on the ground.. ’ To dismiss, or express disdain for using such tabloids as a form for political inquiry is to negate certain forms of knowledge production: important narrative forms to which attention must be paid.. Further, and what came out during Q A, as a culture we seem to disdain certain forms of media, but revel in others.. How is it that I am negatively implicated for reading.. , but positively implicated for engaging in ‘high culture’ medias, such as.. The New York Times.. ? How is it that I am implicated in contributing to the death of Princess Diana through consumer practice, but not implicated in contributing to the war in Iraq when I watch President Bush on CNN?.. Finally, I use my interest in Britney as a lecture strategy, as a way to engage students, mostly undergraduate students at the School of Disability Studies at Ryerson University, into thinking critically about how her ‘tragic descent into madness’ has played out in the press.. It is an easy entry point for them: almost all of the students know the story.. Again, it is a surprise for them to be confronted with thinking about Britney Spears in a scholarly way.. There are always some students who are really into it; others who are above it; and then those who are ignorant of it all.. But by the end of the lecture, I can tell that students have started to think differently about ‘the case’ of Britney, and at best one can hope that they will start to trouble the ways that young women in general and madness in particular are represented in popular culture.. Bad Bodied Britney.. One of the things that particularly intrigues me about tabloid magazines is the way that they monitor female celebrity bodies.. How they will compile images of a particular celebrity, compare contrast and comment on her figure: the before and afters; the she’s too fat, she’s too thin; Pregnant!; Starving! There is a demand on the celebrity body that it remain constant, unchanged.. There is often an embodied moment in the celebrity body when it becomes iconic: usually at its thinnest, its youngest, its fittest.. That captured image of the celebrity body becomes the template from which any deviation is remarked upon, troubled, noticed.. There is a demand for self-governance, a call to both starlets and their followers to call on technologies of the self (diet! exercise! cleanse!) in order to maintain that primary body: the body from which anything else is a deviation, which must be worked upon.. I offer up the image of a nineteen year old Britney as she performed at the 2001 MTV Video Music Awards (VMA’S) as her iconic body moment.. It is a well known image: Blond, tight, toned, in little more that a green bikini top and gypsy-esque bikini bottom, she is all abs, sinewy muscle and wrapped in a huge albino Burmese python, left dangling around her shoulders (see:.. youtube.. com/watch? v=ONuHuiWwcJQ.. She is top form, the pop princess: the image for which she is to be held.. Her health, her desire, and in multiple ways her worth are all tied up with that iconic body: a body which she was vocal at working hard for (1,000 sit ups a day), and which it was expected that she would maintain.. Fast-forward five years, and you can see, through tabloid monitoring, how her body came to be problematized.. Pre-baby, images of her eating Cheetos with her husband became rampant fodder for tabloid scrutiny.. Post-baby, concerns about her lack of diligence in returning to that iconic body sold papers.. It is in that liminal space following the birth of her second child, towards the fall and early winter of 2006, that Britney’s body falls under deep scrutiny in the tabloid press.. There is an expectation for her to return to normalcy: for her, it is that iconic body that she so well exemplified in 2001.. Her failure (or refusal) to do so heightened the media monitoring of her ‘not-good-enough’ embodiment.. There is a link between her non-conforming body at this stage in her timeline that I think led to concern that all was not right with Britney.. The failure for her to reshape her body into pre-pregnancy form in the months following her second birth (as is now expected of celebrity moms) came to be understood as a problem in the press.. What was wrong with Britney? The press began to ask.. I think that the entry point into the possibility that Britney was not ‘well’ was very much an embodied process, by which her failure to re-conform back into her proper self lead to the conclusion that all was not as it should be.. As Shildrick notes, “we demand of modern biomedicine that all disruptions to the self’s ‘clean and proper body’ should be dealt with, that the actual vulnerability of the embodied self and its propensity to diverge from the normative structures of health and well-being should be covered over, or managed out of existence, by a technologically driven bioscience.. In short, corporeal difference is badly tolerated” (.. Shildrick, 2008.. Britney, and her management, seemed unable to contain and control her body.. And “in modernist terms, the model of a “normal” body implies one in which everything is predictable, well-ordered and functional.. the body must be constantly maintained.. to forestall the lurking threat of disruption” (.. 33).. These first signs of ‘body trouble’ were picked up by the press, but mostly mockingly, and understood through her unwillingness to reign in her appetites.. The infamous pictures of her out partying on the night of November 27 2006, when the paparazzi caught images of her without her underwear, made international headlines.. The winter 2007 head-shaving incident again brought her to the attention of the press, and led to much commentary and criticism: “Of all of the highly intrusive pictures that have made Britney Spears the reigning goddess of poor life choices and bad parenting, it is impossible to ignore the surpassing weirdness of the image of the world’s biggest pop star seated in front of a mirror in a Ventura Boulevard hair salon on February 16, 2007, electric razor in hand, looking blindly at the camera whiles shaving off all her hair.. Her look was at once vulnerable and wildly alienated, the expression one might expect to see on the face of a young cult member who had just set fire to her birth certificate on the sidewalk” (.. Samuels, 2008.. 40).. Her fall 2007 performance at the MTV VMA awards was supposed to be her comeback: and what better place to hold it than at the awards show that she had ruled in 2001? But her performance was a muddled one, and she was heavily criticized in the press for appearing bloated, “out of shape and disengaged” (.. voanews.. com/english/archive/2007-09/2007-09-11-voal5.. cfm.. By fall 2007 she was framed as a ‘bad girl’: an uncontrollable party girl, drinking, possibly drugging, with close-ups of her flab and double chin making headlines.. It was during these months that the all out war against Britney erupted: against her unmanaged sexuality, the sullying of her good Southern femininity, her inability to mother, her incapacity to be shamed.. Her inability (or refusal) to discipline herself, or to allow her extensive PR team to discipline her.. It felt like an embodied sign of protest, with Britney “uncovering parts of the body that should be covered, inverting values of beauty, morality, and cleanliness routinely inscribed onto the body, [and] altogether flouting the sartorial signs of status and respectability [that can be] significant and effective ways of resisting a dominant order” (.. Masquelier, 2005.. 16).. She was a leaky, unclean, disruptive mess: and forces from all sides were struggling to ‘make sense’ of what was happening to Brit Brit.. Making Sense: from Bad to Mad.. I’ll start with a brief description of what happened to Britney: to the context, before I delve into the content.. Britney is ‘bad’ in Fall 2007: she’s on drugs, she drinks until she is sick, she is an unfit mother, and ex-wife, she avoids the gym, she has inappropriate sexual relations.. Her hair’s a mess, she eats junk food, she is angry.. She flashes her privates: she no longer embodies the All-American girl.. Then, the tangible shift happens over December 2007 and into early January 2008: that shift from ‘bad’ to ‘mad.. ’ She has post-partum depression; she’s suffering; she’s in sweatpants; she’s out of control; she’s crazy.. Speculation leads to certitude when, on the night of January 3rd 2008 Britney is involuntarily held at Cedars-Sinai Medical Centre.. Images are captured of her being carted out of her home and “despite being strapped to a gurney, Spears is smiling and laughing as she’s put in an ambulance” (.. US Weekly.. , January 26, 2008, p.. She is held on a 72 hour mental lockdown, but is quickly released.. She is reinstitutionalized towards the end of January 2008, where she spends “seven days at the [UCLA Medical Center] even though her psychiatrist had extended her stay.. to a 14-day involuntary hold.. It was her second early departure from an involuntary mental-evaluation hospitalization.. www.. people.. com/people/article/o,,20176565,00.. html?xid=rrs-fullcontentcnn.. Her father is granted conservatorship over Britney’s affairs (which is currently in place until December 2008).. Britney continues to struggle: lashing out at the press, driving erratically, sobbing in public.. She is now officially a train wreck, a spoiled identity: the descent, that tragedy of American marketing.. The bald, the not beautiful enough disappointment that Britney turned out to be.. The Fall.. A collapse that began to be framed and understood through medical model concepts of mental illness.. A dramatic shift occurred in the weeks that separated the ‘bad’ from the ‘mad’ Britney.. Prior to her initial institutionalization, a hostile press continued to prey on Britney for her bad girl misdeeds.. But once re-conceptualized as ‘mad,’ the press swiftly refocused their approach to Britney: from one of hostility to one of concern.. Her misbehaviour was suddenly reinterpreted as signs of symptomology, and Britney was no longer a bad party girl: but suddenly, a vulnerable girl suffering from disease.. Making Meaning of Britney.. The abundance of content ripe for textual analysis in the media ‘case file’ of Britney Spears is overwhelming.. My main goal in the upcoming pages is to show how, through the ‘case file’ or ‘examination’ of Britney Spears through tabloid reporting, a lot has been said about mental illness.. Britney Spears has brought out into the open in the popular presses a supposedly taboo subject -- and the silence surrounding mental illness is often thought to lead to the stigma associated with mental illness.. Most proponents of the biomedical approach to madness would contend that this is a good thing -- that the more coverage ‘mental illness’ gets, the better.. Psychiatry draws and depends on a plethora of social institutions and systems of meaning in order to ‘make sense’ of madness.. As Nikolas Rose (from whom I draw heavily on for this analysis) notes:.. “Child psychiatrists would reach out to into the ordinary homes of ordinary citizens through popular books and radio broadcasts, and would educate and instruct parents in the adoption of regimes to ensure mental normality and adjustment in their offspring.. almost every violation of institutional and social norms of conduct would be accorded a psychological meaning, not so much to be judged, but to be understood.. The new imperatives were: investigate, assess, prescribe, treat” (.. Rose, 1996.. My worry is precisely this.. That psychiatry has found a new source, through the body of Britney, to translate, disperse and solidify biomedical understandings of madness.. Psychiatry as a science has a history that remains highly contested and unstable.. In order to advance its conceptualizations of madness, it must work hard at promoting itself through a myriad of means.. As Nikolas Rose has suggested, psychiatric experts are required to collaborate with other professionals in order to strategize and manage psychiatric powers across the territory of the community.. Psy professions, as they currently sit at the cusp of the 21st century, are now working under the rubrics of choice, empowerment, management, and recovery.. They also find themselves “caught up within a culture of blame, in which almost any unfortunate event becomes a ‘tragedy’  ...   to crying alone in her car, a further sign of “spinning out of control.. Prolonged apathy.. : She seemed indifferent after losing custody.. And her appearance is increasingly more unkept.. “People stop caring when they get depressed,” says Lieberman.. Bizarre ideas.. : Trading outfits with strangers and asking for work at Les Deux [a Hollywood club] point to “desperation” and “vulnerability.. Poor eating and sleeping habits.. : She often sleeps until 1 pm, says a source.. Her diet? Taco Bell, McDonald’s and Pizza hut.. Excessive anxieties.. : Lieberman says Spears’ tendency to say things like, “I look ugly” reveals a profound insecurity in social situations.. , November 19, 2007.. This conveyance of knowledge works to problematize almost any behaviour into the realm of psychiatric illness.. And this is where we currently sit today as a disordered society: one that works to explain any ‘trouble’ through biomedical models of mental illness.. Indeed, our current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV) “runs to 886 pages and classifies some 350 distinct disorders.. The broad categories of the start of the 20th century -- depression, schizophrenia, neurosis -- are no longer adequate.. Pathologies of mood, cognition, will, or affect are dissected at a different scale.. The psychiatric gaze is no longer molar but molecular” (.. Rose, 2007.. 199).. What this means to us as a bio-culture is that we have come to understand ourselves as constituted subjects through these signs and symptoms: “The DSM may once have been compiled from “case studies,” as narratives of investigation into the aetiology and trajectory of “mental disorders.. ” However, a threshold has been crossed so that it is the lives of patients that are now expected to conform to the models of “mental disorders,” rather than the other way round.. Ingram, n.. d.. We can all ‘see ourselves’ in this list of signs and symptoms, and are thus all implicated in our potential to become diagnosable subjects.. Hyper-vigilance is called upon, on ourselves, our neighbours, our social worlds: a bio-politics of our everyday praxis that induces us to self-manage, as well as to monitor others’ management.. Within this judgment, the story of Britney is used as an educational tool to harness risk management.. Stories that are told about mental illness can be used to.. point to the misery caused by the apparent symptoms of this diagnosed.. or untreated condition, and interpret available data so as to maximize.. beliefs about prevalence.. They aim to draw the attention of lay persons.. and medical practitioners to the existence of the disease and the availability.. of treatment, shaping their fears and anxieties into a clinical form.. These.. often involve the use of public relations firms to recruit the media, supplying.. experts who will give their opinions to substantiate the stories, and providing.. victims who will tell their stories (.. 214).. One such example of a ‘real life victim of mental illness’ is drawn on in the pages of.. to elucidate the dangers of mental illness:.. A REAL-LIFE BIPOLAR MOM:.. Carol* (*not her real name) was a wild, uncontrollable 18-year-old.. when she became a mother.. But after some manic episodes (including.. joyriding with her infant son in the car), she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder.. Carol soon decided to give up her baby, then 18 months, to family friends for.. adoption.. Now 28, the Idaho resident -- who says she’s doing.. “really well” and still has contact with her 9-year-old boy -- tells US her.. story: I had these mood swings and would come across as being on drugs.. When Britney shaved her hair, I could relate.. It’s a manic impulsivity.. You.. think something is a great idea, and two hours later, you go, “Oh, my God,.. what did I do?”.. Giving up my son was hard -- but I wasn’t stable enough.. and his father wasn’t in the picture.. It was my sanest decision.. I think Britney.. can make it, but once you get your mind stabilized, you have to pick up the.. shambles of your life.. It will take her a while to fix that.. Bartolomeo, 2008.. 51).. Through this tabloid account, the pseudonymous Carol (still stigmatized enough to require confidentiality) uses her pedagogic account to tell us particular things about mental illness: specifically, that mentally ill women are irresponsible, impulsive, and unfit to mother.. Further, by drawing out this account, the narrator invites us on a “journey from hostility to an illness model of their condition, through to reluctant acceptance of drug treatment, recovery, and conversion to biomedical and genetic ideas of the origins of mental disorder” (.. 216).. Psy Media Monitoring.. Britney’s constant monitoring by the paparazzi has allowed tabloids to draw on images to create collages of timelines -- photographic proofs -- that are pulled together in montages and tell a story: about her descent; about her recovery; about her relapses.. These powerful images work together to create a history, and are used in magazine pages to convey an ‘examination,’ a ‘psychiatric history’ that enables the reader to follow the status of her mental health.. We are invited in to judge for ourselves Britney’s wellbeing through such images, which enact almost a clinical case study, wherein the public is invited in to judge, assess, and determine, week by week, how Britney is doing.. With headlines like “Countdown to Meltdown: Britney’s 4 year decent into insanity” (.. Star Magazine, January 21 2008, p.. 57-58.. ) and “Britney Relapses: Lies, delusions and destructive behaviour -- Britney Spears’ erratic lifestyle returns.. What went wrong?” (.. In Touch, April 21, 2008.. 37) accompanying photographs of her, the reader is asked to join in on her ‘journey through’ mental illness.. The images are used, usually against her, to convey to us ‘how she is doing.. ’ A powerful example of how this works is the case of the pink wig.. Prior to institutionalization, Britney was seen around town wearing a hot pink bob-with-bangs wig.. We came to be informed, through her then-manager Sam Lufti, that when Britney is wearing the pink wig, she is having a manic episode.. Manic and pink wig became associated, and as the images of pink-wigged wearing Britney played out in the press, it informed the audience when she was having a ‘manic day.. ’ Thus, in many tabloids, photographs of a hot-pink haired Britney were printed, with captions attached to them, such as “’When the pink wig comes on, it’s getting bad,’ Lufti says of Britney (pictured buying laxatives Jan 30) and her manic states” (.. , February 18 2008.. Every time Britney was captured wearing this pink wig: she was having a manic episode.. If she was blond, she was in recovery; if she was pink-wigged, she was having a relapse (.. 37).. Eventually, this wig became such a marker of Britney’s madness, that her father was reported to have confiscated it.. Similarly, images captured of Britney behaving ‘badly’ are taken as signs that she is off her medication.. Images of Britney working out are used as proof that she is on the road to recovery.. Images of Britney crying tell us that she is suffering: [Britney pictured crying] “‘In her depressive episode, it’s all crying’” Lufti tells.. US.. of Britney” (.. Any of the countless images that are captured of Britney on a daily basis can be used against her as a form of psy-media monitoring, allowing us to endlessly infer and judge her mental states.. Britney, through her own imaging, cannot escape the psychiatric gaze.. Tabloid reporting also works to organize Britney into a patient who is either cooperating with psychiatry, or non-compliant.. The reporting teaches us how to be a good psychiatric patient through Britney’s coverage: what steps a mentally ill person must enact in order to get better.. Compliance, treatment, drug and talk therapies are all understood as valued ‘cures’ to mental illness -- and are never questioned (iatrogenic, anyone?).. When Britney is understood as enacting the good mental health patient, there is hope.. As was reported in a February 18 2008 article in.. , when Britney is reported to be complying with psychiatric medicine, she is supported by the press.. And given advice by psychiatrists to continue her compliance, as Dr Carole Lieberman, a UCLA psychiatrist is quoted as saying “I hope the psychiatrists have the courage to keep her there more than 30 days.. If she starts cooperating and the psychiatrists take her off the hold, she’s so impulsive she might decide to leave.. She needs six months in a psychiatric hospital and [to] work with [doctors] in therapy to figure out her underlying diagnosis.. 62).. Conversely, when Britney refuses to comply with psychiatric intervention, she is maligned by the press and much ado is made about her resistance: “Lynne meets with Britney’s father, Jamie, and Britney’s psychiatrist at the star’s Beverly Hills home to persuade her to enter an in-patient psychiatric facility.. Britney responds by sneaking out” (.. 63).. Ultimately, we are told by the tabloids what Britney needs to do in order to recover: and by extension, we become informed that those deemed mentally ill must follow a psychiatric regimen if they are to be understood as responsible citizens:.. Treating Spears’ Issues.. Florida-based clinical psychologist Sharon Fried Buchalter (who has not met the singer) talks.. through a potential treatment plan for the pop star.. EVALUATION.. : Spears should undergo psychological testing.. “She should be monitored in an in-patient setting until they can figure out what type of medication and dosage would work for her particular disorder.. THERAPY.. : She should go “one to three times a week.. COMPLIANCE.. : If Spears does require medication, she will have to be responsible enough to take it regularly.. , February 11 2008: 77).. It is all laid out before us in those innocuous tabloid presses, through the study of Britney.. The solution to the ‘problem’ of mental illness has apparently been discovered: comply with the psy disciplines, and you will find cure; resist, and you will suffer.. As Rose so eloquently notes:.. In the field of health, the active and responsible citizen must engage.. in a constant monitoring of health, a constant work of modulation,.. adjustment, improvement in response to the changing requirements.. of the practices of his or her mode of everyday life.. Similarly, the new psychiatric.. and pharmaceutical technologies for the government of the soul oblige the.. individual to engage in constant risk management, to monitor and.. evaluate mood, emotion, and cognition according to a finer and more.. continuous process of self-scrutiny.. The person, educated by disease.. awareness campaigns, understanding him-or herself at least in part in neurochemical terms,.. in conscientious alliance with health care professionals, and by means of.. niche-marketed pharmaceuticals, is to take control of these modulations.. in the name of maximizing his or her potential,.. recovering his or her self, shaping the self in fashioning a life.. 223).. Re/covering.. Britney, for those who don’t know, is on the mend.. She is, in psy discipline terms, working on ‘recovery.. ’ This has been much celebrated in the tabloids since summer 2008, as images rejoice in her return to the blond, buff, All-American Girl.. Headlines such as “Britney Spears: The Change is Amazing” (.. , May 5, 2008.. 54); “Getting her Life Back” (.. , August 18, 2008.. 21); and “Britney Spears: Body Makeover” (.. , October 6, 2008.. 27) tell us as much.. Indeed, her return to the MTV VMA’s in Fall 2008, embodying a look strikingly similar to that of her old self in 2001, caused the audience and press alike to proclaim that ‘She’s Back!’ Back from: distress, mental illness, mania, unmanaged madness.. Back to her true self: recovering from a disease that interrupted her storyline as the pop princess.. “What a difference a year makes! Last September, a bloated Britney Spears muddled through an embarrassing performance of her single “Gimme More” at the MTV Video Music Awards.. But this year, she stole the show.. Looking fit and fab in a shimmery Versace mini.. she took center stage -- and got a standing ovation -- as she welcomed the crowd.. And if that wasn’t enough, Brit scored [three awards].. Star Magazine, September 22, 2008, p.. Britney is, as understood through the popular press, currently back: a comeback, coming back from her descent into the deviation from the norm.. An embodied comeback: once again thin, blond, buff, feminine, contained.. Her true self restored.. A mad analysis must work towards interrupting this storyline.. Just as feminist post-structuralist and disability studies scholars have troubled the notion of a singularly coherent body (see.. Butler, 1997.. Shildrick.. et al.. , 2005.. ), mad studies must intervene on this idea that madness is always an undesirable state that is due to disease and interferes with representations of our true self.. We are more than one dimension, and mad pride must work towards accepting and embracing deviations from essentialist notions of ‘one true self.. ’ We must work towards recognizing states that are understood through psy models (such as depression, anxiety, mania, psychosis) as part of our makeup as mad subjects.. We must promote the paradigm of choice within the fields of self-identification, treatment, and management (see,.. Cheng.. , 2008.. We should work towards troubling the shaming and oppressive practices that teach us to repress, rather than accept or revel, in our multiplicity of ways of being.. The illness, treatment, recovery trajectory that psy disciplines dictate offers little freedom in accommodating and embracing the diverse statuses that a subject might experience throughout their lives.. Psy disciplines continue to hold the notion that there is a true self, that can (and must) be restored through drug management: “The drug thus does not promise to create a false self, on the contrary, it is through the drug that the self is restored to itself.. If there is one theme or promise that runs through all these promotional materials [on drug therapies] it is this: with this drug, I can get my real self back, I can feel like myself, I can feel like me again” (.. Rose, 2007, p.. 214.. The recovery model of mental illness promotes the notion that there is a best self, and that all roads to recovery must lead to that one, sane subject.. That the eye on the prize should always be to “restore the self to its life, and itself, again” (.. 211.. The final question I want to leave the reader with is this: what is at stake? What investment does psychiatry have in ensuring that Britney as a patient follows the course of treatment, compliance, and recovery that the story of mental health dictates? I propose that how the storyline of ‘Bipolar Britney’ plays out in the tabloids matters to psychiatry.. That psy professions in general -- and psychiatry in particular -- as it evolves into the 21st century, sits on a precarious credibility which depends on constant re-legitimation in order to hold stable its assertions that madness is a problem of science and disease.. It must constantly work to justify the profusion of social, legal, political, financial and scientific interventions and institutions that rely on the premise of ‘mental illness.. ’ Within this struggle to power, subject and system resistance is always concurrently at work, chipping away at and destabilizing psy discourses, which in turn forces psy disciplines to work hard to restabilize: “sometimes power struggles are like that.. An equilibrium is achieved; the forces in play in a given situation oppose each other repeatedly in exactly the same ways at exactly the same points, so that the situation looks stable” (.. 43).. But I want to remind the reader that psy disciplines are as unstable as the ways that Bipolar Britney is portrayed in the press.. And that how Britney manages, or refuses to manage, the making of her self as a mentally ill patient, will impact (either positively or negatively) how our culture responds to both psy and mad practices alike.. Agrell, S.. (May 2 2008).. “Twice as many teens seek help for mental health” Globe and Mail: retrieved 05/05/2008 at http://www.. theglobeandmail.. com/servlet/story/RTGAM.. 20080502.. wxlmentalhealth02/BNS.. Anderson, M.. “‘One flew over the psychiatric unit:’ Mental illness and the media.. ” Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 10, 297-306.. Bartolomeo, J.. (March 3 2008).. “7 Weeks without Mommy.. ”.. , 46-51.. The Psychic Life of Power.. Stanford: Stanford University Press.. Cheng, R.. , Church, K.. , Costa, L.. , Harris, D.. , Moffat, K.. , Mohammed, S.. , Poole, J.. , Reville, D.. , Stackhouse, R.. R.. , Strong, A.. (June 2008).. Mental Health “Recovery:” Users and Refusers.. Final Report.. Nothing about us without us: What do psychiatric survivors in Toronto think about mental health “recovery.. Toronto: Wellesley Institute.. Fleeman, M.. (February 6 2008).. Britney Spears Released from UCLA Pych Ward.. People Online.. : retrieved 10/11/2008 (www.. com/people/article /o,,20176565,00.. html?xid=rrs-fullcontentcnn).. Ingram, R.. A.. (n.. Reports from the psych wars: Retrieved 10/08/08 at: http://www.. mentalhealthstigma.. com/thepsychwars.. In Touch Magazine (April 21 2008).. Britney Relapses.. In Touch Magazine.. , 36-38.. In Touch Magazine (February 4 2008).. I’m not Crazy.. In.. Touch Magazine.. , 36-39.. In Touch Magazine (February 18 2008).. She’s Medicated.. , 39.. Masquelier, A.. Dirt, undress, and difference: An introduction, pp.. 1-33.. In Adeline Masquelier (Ed.. Dirt, Undress, and Difference: Critical perspectives on the body’s surface.. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.. McDonald, R.. (11 Sept.. 2007).. Spears MTV Video Music Awards Ceremony opener draws criticism.. VOANews.. com: Retrieved 01/11/2008: http://www.. com/ english/archive/2007-09/2007-09-11-voal5.. Sex, Race, and Biopower: A Foucauldian genealogy.. Hypatia.. ,19(3), 39-62.. Mills, S.. Michel Foucault.. Nairn, R.. G.. Media portrayals of mental illness, or is it madness? A review.. Australian Psychologist.. , 42(2), 138-146.. Pearson, Jennifer, Clark, Sandra.. (February 18 2008).. Inside Britney’s Psych Ward Hell.. Star Magazine.. , 41-46.. People Magazine (October 6 2008).. Scoop: Britney Spears Body Makeover.. , 27.. People Magazine (August 18 2008).. Scoop: Britney Spears getting her life back.. , 21.. Samuels, D.. The Britney show: Days and nights with the new paparazzi.. The Atlantic.. , April 2008, 36-51.. The politics of life itself: Biomedicine, power, and subjectivity in the twenty-first century.. “Psychiatry as a political science: Advanced liberalism and the administration of risk.. , 9(2): 1-23.. Schneider, Karen S.. , Smolowe, Jill.. (Feb 18 2008).. Britney Interrupted.. , 58-63.. Shildrick, M.. “Corporeal cuts: Surgery and the psycho-social.. Body Society.. , 14(1), 31-46.. Shildrick, Margrit and Mykitiuk, Roxanne (2005).. Ethics of the Body: Postconventional challenges.. Cambridge: MIT Press.. Star Magazine (September 22 2008).. Starshots: Three’s a Charm.. , 1.. Star Magazine (January 21 2008).. “Countdown to Meltdown: Britney’s 4 year descent into insanity.. , 57-58.. Tauber, M.. and Tan, M.. (January 21 2008).. Britney in Crisis.. , 62-68.. Youtube.. “Britney Spears Vma Extremely (HQ).. ” retrieved 01/11/2008: http://www.. com/watch? v=ONuHuiWwcJQ).. Us Weekly, (November 19 2007).. “What are the Signs of Mental Illness.. , 17.. US Weekly (January 26 2008).. “From Deposition to Discharge.. , 55.. US Weekly (February 11 2008).. “Treating Spears’ Issues.. , 77.. US Weekly, (February 18 2008).. “Burning Questions Answered.. , 62-66.. US Weekly (May 5 2008).. “Hot Stuff: Britney Spears: ‘The change is amazing.. ’”.. , 54.. 1].. I’d like to thank Dr Richard Ingram, Dr Kathryn Church, David Reville, Dr Sheryl Nestel, Dr Kimberley White, Dr Alison Howell, Jeremiah Bach and Michael Voronka for their inspiration, suggestions, and support.. Biographical note:.. Jijian Voronka is a PhD student in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies at OISE/University of Toronto.. She is interested in building and strengthening psychiatric survivor-led research and knowledge production within both academic and community realms..

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  • Title: "Patient-Centred" Path towards Ignoring Patient Rights
    Descriptive info: A Critical Analysis of the Federal Senate Committee's Dismissal of Concerns about Involuntary Treatment Laws and Civil Rights Abuses in the Canadian Mental Health System.. Rob Wipond [.. Preface.. The Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology released a report on the mental health system in.. 2006.. , "Out of the Shadows at Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction Services in Canada".. The Committee's central recommendation was that Canada create a more patient-centred mental health system.. Yet, the Committee utterly failed to address the fundamental lack of patients' legal rights which drives the current, non-patient-centred system.. Despite extensive discussions and witness testimonials that were extremely critical of routine involuntary psychiatric treatment and civil rights abuses in the Canadian mental health system, the Committee's final report included no recommendations in this area.. Through analysis of the language, arguments and rhetoric in the Committee's writings, this paper demonstrates that the Senate Committee 1) accepted uncritically numerous erroneous or unproven claims from particular mental health professionals about the accuracy and efficacy of psychological and psychiatric science, and 2) deliberately misrepresented and ignored important civil rights issues surrounding involuntary treatment due to their uncritical faith in psychiatric science and deeply embedded prejudices against people diagnosed with mental illnesses.. As a result, Canada lost an ideal opportunity to develop a more balanced national discussion of current involuntary treatment laws and point towards more progressive options.. Reports about Canada's health care system published in 2002 by the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology raised serious concerns about Canada's mental health care system (.. Standing Senate Committee, 2002.. As a result, in.. , the Senate began an investigation specifically into mental health care.. Senator Michael Kirby was appointed to chair the investigation, leading research and consultations over the next three years.. Three "interim" mental health reports were released in November of 2004.. In May of 2006, the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology released its concluding report, referred to here as the "Final Report", "Out of the Shadows at Last: Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction Services in Canada" (.. Standing Senate Committee, 2006.. This Final Report lacked any specific legal authority, and acknowledged that health care was primarily under the jurisdiction of provincial and territorial governments rather than the federal government.. Nevertheless, its approximately six hundred pages represented the most extensive overview of mental health services ever done in Canada, and were intended to provide a guiding roadmap for reform.. One of the principle recommendations, the creation of a Mental Health Commission of Canada to help further the Final Report's other recommendations, was enacted by the federal government in March of 2007 and Michael Kirby was named Chair of the new Commission.. Since then, over $200 million in federal funding has strengthened the Mental Health Commission's growing role in helping set agendas and conduct and guide policies and programs across the country (.. Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2008.. Overview: The Final Report's Central Recommendation and the Key Missing Element.. The main thrust of the Senate Committee's arguments and conclusions in the Final Report revolves around making Canada's mental health services more patient-centred and focused on recovery.. The section on "Vision and Principles" concludes, "In the Committee’s view, what is needed is a genuine system that puts people living with mental illness at its centre, with a clear focus on their ability to recover.. " (.. 37) Repeated critical emphasis is given throughout the Final Report to the "severely limited" range of choices currently available to mental health patients, and frequent endorsements are given to the idea of offering people living with mental illness "the opportunity to choose" from a wide range of services and supports those which will "benefit them most" (.. 46).. The "Summary of Principles" section argues that mental health patients "must be accorded equal respect and consideration" as patients suffering physical illnesses.. In addition, the Committee writes, mental health patients must have full responsibility for their own recovery while utilizing to their own benefit "collaboration" from friends, family, the community, and mental health professionals.. The Committee declares, "It is people living with mental illness themselves who should be, to the maximum extent possible, the final arbiters of the services that are made available within the overall mental health system and of the ways in which they are delivered.. 57-8).. In this context, well-established tenets of patient empowerment, such as different therapeutic options, housing, employment, community supports, peer support networks, and patient involvement in policy and program design, are repeatedly described as central to reforming the mental health system, and are given strong endorsements in the Committee's recommendations.. There is, however, a major block standing in the way of literally every type of patient-centred or patient-empowered reform which the Committee proposes.. In every jurisdiction in Canada, people who have been diagnosed with mental illnesses are potentially subject to involuntary committal laws that can remove from them most of the civil rights and powers which ordinary citizens take for granted.. Mental health patients can be certified under mental health legislation and stripped of many powers to make decisions for themselves both inside and outside of hospitals, and even when these powers are not stripped from them, they must nevertheless live with the constant threat that such an event could occur at any time relatively quickly and easily.. A person may be involuntarily committed and incarcerated in a psychiatric hospital and/or made subject to involuntary outpatient treatment orders while living in the community if he or she is threatening bodily harm to others.. However, in most jurisdictions in Canada today, a person may also be certified "in the interests of the person’s own safety or the safety of others" (.. Province of New Brunswick, 1973.. , s.. 7.. 1) or, quite simply, if the person is deemed to be in danger of mental or physical "deterioration" or "impairment" if left untreated (.. Province of British Columbia, 1996.. 22;.. Province of Ontario, 2004.. 19;.. Province of Manitoba, 1998.. 8.. 1).. Meanwhile, no jurisdiction in Canada provides any legal or scientific criteria for what exactly in this context constitutes "safety", "deterioration", or "impairment", or even provides a legal definition or scientific reference for what constitutes a mental health examination or a mental illness.. So in practical terms, the treating psychiatrist renders final judgments about any particular patient's status under involuntary committal laws with wide-ranging personal and professional discretion.. A second psychiatrist's signature is typically required for longer term certifications, but according to legislation this can usually be a routine sign-off by the director of the treating hospital.. The rights of people who are involuntarily committed vary somewhat amongst jurisdictions.. Generally, individuals may be restrained, incarcerated and, in most Canadian jurisdictions, forcibly treated with chemical, electro-convulsive, or other interventions for periods of weeks or months, while certification renewals can extend committal orders essentially indefinitely.. Certified mental patients typically have limited access, or in some cases no access at all except by extraordinary measures, to legal advocates, appeal procedures, or the court system.. Involuntary committals and involuntary treatment are not rare; indeed, involuntary committal and coercion into treatment under the threat of involuntary committal are a principal component of the daily routine of psychiatric hospitals and the mental health system in Canada.. Sklar, 2004.. Wipond, 1998a.. Wipond, 1998b.. Clearly, then, no serious discussion of empowering mental health patients to choose their own strategies for recovery can take place without addressing the fact that these same people can be and regularly are stripped of many rights and powers of decision-making over their own treatment or recovery by their treating psychiatrists.. However, "Out of the Shadows at Last" leaves this entire, absolutely central conundrum largely unaddressed.. Careful review of the discussions about the legal and civil rights of patients in the mental health system in the Senate Committee's interim reports, in the testimonials from witnesses, and in the Final Report, demonstrate that this omission was deliberate.. While the Committee apparently wanted to give a public show of support towards empowering patients in their own recoveries, in fact, the Committee chose to distort, ignore and ultimately purge extensive testimony about widespread and routine abuses of the civil rights of mental patients in Canada, and instead gave much weightier support to particular mental health professionals who strongly advocated for forced treatment and reduced patient powers.. Ultimately, this undermines the central stated intent of "Out of the Shadows at Last" and, rather than helping mental health patients actively guide their own recoveries, provides a template for an even broader assault on civil rights in Canada.. Overview of the Interim Reports.. The Committee released three interim reports in November of 2004.. Interim Report 2 is an overview of mental health programs in selected other countries and is not pertinent to this discussion.. However, Interim Report 1, "Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction: Overview of Policies and Programs in Canada" (.. Standing Senate Committee, 2004a.. ), and Interim Report 3, "Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction: Issues and Options for Canada" (.. Standing Senate Committee, 2004b.. ), are key to understanding the arc of the Committee's attitudes about involuntary treatment that ultimately led to the Final Report.. Analysis of Interim Report 3.. The purpose of Interim Report 3, writes the Committee, is "to outline the major issues facing the provision of mental health services and addiction treatment in Canada, to present potential policy options to address some of these issues, and to launch a public debate to enable Canadians to provide input on how the issues should be addressed.. 1) In this report, the template is outlined for the primary topics which will be explored at greater length in Interim Report 1 and then brought towards recommendations for reform in the Final Report.. There are chapters dedicated to financing of mental health, jurisdictional authorities of the various levels of government, the needs of specific population groups, workplace issues, the state of scientific research etc.. Issues surrounding mental health law and involuntary treatment are only hinted at briefly in Interim Report 3.. In chapter one, "A Patient/Client-Centered System Oriented Toward Recovery and With Personalized Care Plans", the Committee notes that "Providing services and supports that are tailored to meet individual needs is fundamental to recovery.. 6) Later in that same section, the Committee writes, "Accordingly, how can a patient/client oriented system ensure an appropriate balance between the rights of individuals with severe mental disorders and the role of society in caring compassionately for them while also protecting itself?" (.. 6) This crucial topic of involuntary treatment and the balancing of rights is developed more in Interim Report 1.. Analysis of Interim Report 1.. In Interim Report 1, the Committee discusses involuntary treatment within a number of distinct sections dealing with a variety of legal and ethical issues.. Along with these sections, it is also vital to examine how the Committee handled the issues of psychological and psychiatric science and the biomedical theory of mental illness, because these subjects are tightly interwoven with the ethical issues surrounding involuntary treatment.. Clearly, as long as one believes fully that psychological disturbances are biological diseases of the brain, then treatment of those disturbances, even if it is against people's wills, seems to be fundamentally and finally a health care issue; the operational analogy becomes not that of a protester being dragged to prison to be tortured, but that of an unconscious car accident victim being rushed to hospital for life-saving surgery.. The choice of analogy then dramatically affects the ensuing discussion of the ethical issues surrounding treatment without consent.. At no point in any of the reports does the Committee grapple with any scientific details.. Specific diagnostic categories are never critically examined, particular drugs or other extant treatments like electroconvulsive therapy or lobotomy are never discussed, and the deeply radical differences and conflicts between different schools of psychiatry and psychology are never mentioned.. When the Committee briefly reviews various types of mental illness, it does so by uncritically utilizing currently popular psychiatric diagnostic manuals, and without reviewing either what the most common treatments are in Canada today or the often-poor outcomes associated with them (.. 67-72).. In Chapter 10 (.. 215-230), the Committee summarizes that science "has advanced our understanding" of mental illnesses, and that we are now "closer to understanding” them.. In that growing understanding, the Committee argues, “research.. plays an important role” and we “should devote additional funding” and develop improved “best practices”.. The lack of detail in all of these sections is inscrutable.. While acknowledging a dearth of "best practices" guides in mental health, the Committee provides no discussion or commentary on which experts or areas of expertise should lead development of these documents.. When advocating for more funding for scientific research, the Committee recognizes the prominent role that pharmaceutical companies are currently playing, yet does not even acknowledge the deep, widespread controversy about this role that has arisen in public, government and scientific debates in medical journals in recent years (.. Milloy, 2001.. The Committee also chooses its language carefully; for example, it is not that we.. do not understand.. mental illness, but we are "closer to understanding" it.. All together, this repeated lack of any truly.. critical.. approach to the arguably anemic state of the science of mental illness provides tacit support to the current dominant paradigm and most powerful (through mental health legislation) leaders in the Canadian mental health system: psychiatrists and the biomedical model of mental illness.. This tacit, implicit bias is further evidenced when the Committee does step a little closer towards specifics.. Then, the Committee's statements frequently lapse into pure hubristic support for common, unscientific, unproven claims of average mental health professionals.. For example: "The benefits of early intervention extend to numerous mental illnesses and to individuals of all age groups.. Without early intervention and treatment, child and adolescent disorders frequently continue into adulthood.. If the system does not appropriately screen and treat them early, these childhood disorders are likely to persist and lead to a downward spiral of school failure, poor employment opportunities, and poverty in adulthood.. No other set of illnesses damage so many children so seriously.. 166).. It is unclear where this series of extraordinary claims came from -- in this and in the Final Report where the claims are repeated, no scientific citations are provided.. The remarks do strongly resemble claims made commonly in position statements by prominent Canadian mental health organizations with whom the Committee consulted, like the Schizophrenia Society's position paper on early intervention in schizophrenia (.. Schizophrenia Society, 2008.. However, according to the Cochrane Review on early intervention for psychosis, for example, there were "insufficient trials to draw any definitive conclusions" (.. Marshall and Rathbone, 2006.. In the few trials there were, the researchers found "no difference between intervention and control groups".. Significantly, the British Columbia Branch of the Canadian Mental Health Association (CMHA-BC) found in their own early intervention study in 1998 that "nearly half of participants received an incorrect diagnosis" (.. Macnaughton, 1998.. 7), and consequent unhelpful treatment programs.. No objective rationale is provided to presume the psychiatrists making the second diagnoses were any less prone to error than the initial psychiatrists, so from a patient perspective this study suggested an error rate in early intervention closer to 75%, essentially dramatically undermining  ...   Advocate Nancy Hall noted most provinces do not even provide legal advocates for people being committed.. "Not only are people badly treated, but due process is not often followed," she stated (.. Survivor-activist Francesca Allan provided the Committee with suggested changes to involuntary treatment laws which she had worked out with a branch of the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, and noted many lawyers argue current laws violate Canadians'.. rights (.. Yet very little of these perspectives ended up in the Final Report.. In Chapter 4, "Legal Issues", there are three section topics: access to personal health information; charter of patients rights; mental disorder provisions of the Criminal Code.. In the first section of Chapter 4, the Committee recommends that more extensive electronic tracking of mentally ill individuals be done, and that governments should make it easier for service providers to share the medical and other personal information of mental patients with family, other health practitioners, police etc, even without patient consent (.. 65-72).. In a brief subsection, the Committee also recommends, "That provisions in any provincial legislation that have the effect of barring persons from giving advance directives regarding mental health treatment decisions be repealed.. 70) This latter recommendation is, notably, a significant move towards defending the rights of mental patients to determine their own treatment strategies.. By supporting advance directives, the Committee implicitly concedes that a person should always retain the right to choose, guide or refuse psychiatric treatments.. However, even in an ideal scenario where such directives were recognized under mental health legislation, advance directives would still only empower people who had not yet been declared mentally ill or incompetent.. This is because, once one has been declared mentally ill, writing an advance directive falls into extremely weak and tenuous legal territory.. The Committee never addresses this.. So ultimately, this position further highlights the fact that the Committee implicitly regards a person, once diagnosed as mentally ill, as not deserving of the same rights as others.. In the next section, the idea of a charter of patient rights is discussed.. Clearly, any charter of rights which is earnestly developed by users and service providers together provides an opportunity for reinforcing and extending the rights of patients to choose their preferred treatment strategies and participate in their own recoveries, in concert with the Committee's stated main objective.. However, when discussing the right of patients to be empowered in their treatment or refusal of treatment, the Committee notes that "There was support for adopting a legislated patients' charter [of rights], although it was somewhat less popular with family members and service providers than with those living with mental illness.. 73) The Committee does not elaborate on the significance of this difference of opinion between these three groups, even though it arguably strikes to the very heart of the reason such charters are needed—a person diagnosed with a mental illness often cannot even rely on the support of service providers or family members to defend his or her civil rights.. The Committee then proceeds to argue against any charter of patient rights with a series of peculiar arguments.. The Committee argues that such a charter will sometimes simply "duplicate" existing legislation.. Even though the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), Canada's leading mental healthy facility and research centre, has developed and endorsed a charter that includes some such reiterations of existing legislation, "[t]he unnecessary duplication puzzles the Committee.. 75) Yet the Committee makes no reference to asking anyone, from CAMH or elsewhere, to address their confusions.. But why would it puzzle them at all? The vast majority of declarations of the rights of specific citizen groups which emerge anywhere from local immigration centres to the United Nations are based in part on reiterations of existing legislation.. The intent is for the declaration to serve as reminder and reinforcement of those rights to all involved.. The Committee also laments that a charter could create "further stigmatization" (.. 74).. As has been shown already, being labelled with a mental illness diagnosis automatically puts one into a different subclass of society legally, so why would the Committee object in this way to a charter which would work to remove some of that powerful and very tangible stigmatization? The Committee simultaneously worries that a charter could, rather than boosting patient rights, instead foist "responsibilities" onto patients.. In support of this position, the Committee cites a ".. Charter of Adult and Family Rights and Responsibilities".. created by "The Adult and Family Rights and Responsibilities Charter Committee of Cranbrook, British Columbia".. This document requires mental patients to do things like, "Pay particular attention to your own hygiene.. Poor hygiene is offensive to others.. Bathe, brush you [sic] teeth, and wash your hair regularly.. " It is unclear why the Committee would even cite such a blatantly insulting and prejudiced document not explicitly linked to any major Cranbrook mental health organization or described to have ever been adopted anywhere.. Overall, then, the Committee uses extremely peculiar, under-researched and flimsy arguments to dismiss a powerful method of defending patients' rights which the BC Ombudsman, the leading mental health facility in Ontario, and many other reputable sources had strongly advocated after extensive research and consultations.. In the third section of this chapter, while discussing the mental disorder provisions of the Criminal Code, the Committee finally revisits the question of forced treatment directly.. "The committee heard from many people living with mental illness who strongly oppose forced psychiatric intervention.. Their message was unequivocal – imposed treatment is highly damaging to the autonomy and dignity of affected persons[.. ]" (.. 83) This is followed by extensive quotes reinforcing and elaborating on these issues from Jennifer Chambers, Rob Wipond, Francesca Allan and Eugene LeBlanc from witness testimonies already cited above (.. 83-84).. The Committee then writes, "In light of these and other submissions, the Committee has reservations about involuntary treatment although it may be required in very rare circumstances.. doing so may violate their Charter rights.. " While this statement sounds like, finally, a very heartfelt support in defence of the rights of mental patients to refuse treatments or choose their own treatments, it is quickly revealed to be merely part of a ruse to rationalize actually expanding forced treatment.. The previous statement is followed immediately with this one: "Having said that, the powers granted to courts by the Criminal Code permit involuntary treatment in very limited circumstances.. Treatment decisions may be made on application by the prosecutor for the sole purpose of making a mentally disordered accused fit to stand trial.. Medical evidence must be presented, the disposition is limited to 60 days, and neither psychosurgery nor electroconvulsive therapy may be administered.. We acknowledge the objections to forced psychiatric intervention.. We also recognized, however, the need to shorten the period of time that individuals found unfit to stand trial stay in the system is pressing and substantial.. " (.. 84-85) The Committee then concludes by recommending increasing powers under the Criminal Code to forcibly treat the criminally accused.. So what has happened here? First, it is important to understand that none of the above-quoted witnesses were discussing these rarely-used mental disorder provisions of the Criminal Code.. These witnesses were discussing the involuntary committals and forced treatment which take place every day inside and outside ordinary Canadian psychiatric hospitals under standard mental health legislation, and their testimonials make that abundantly clear.. The overwhelming majority of mental patients in Canada are never charged with any crimes under the Criminal Code and indeed are rarely involved with the mental health system due to any types of criminal activity, but are diagnosed, certified and forcibly treated under jurisdictional mental health legislation.. Yet the Committee never even clarifies this fact, let alone addresses it.. Instead, these witnesses and their very real and legitimate concerns are utterly dismissed by way of a sleight of hand that makes it appear as if their concerns have indeed been addressed.. The Committee is able to express "grave reservations" about involuntary treatment, while reassuringly noting that involuntary treatment is very rarely done under the Criminal Code and that there are many mitigating protections of individual rights under the Criminal Code.. Ironically, none of these listed protections -- the requirement for medical evidence to be presented, the 60-day time limit, the disallowance of electroconvulsive therapy or psychosurgery like lobotomies -- exists for ordinary, non-criminally-accused people under any Canadian provincial or territorial mental health laws.. Yet despite supposed "grave reservations" about forced treatment, the Committee does not discuss this.. Analysis of the Conclusions and Recommendations in the Final Report.. The Committee made just eight recommendations in the Final Report under the topic of "Legal Issues".. Four of these recommendations pertain to increasing public access to the personal medical information of mental health patients.. Three pertain to increasing powers under the Criminal Code to give mental health treatment to accused criminals against their wills.. One recommendation pertains to allowing people to write advance directives and appoint substitute decision makers for mental health care (Standing Senate Committee, 2006, Appendix A, p.. I-II).. No recommendations pertain to limiting the circumstances under which people can be involuntarily committed, or to protecting or extending the rights of ordinary citizens who have been committed to refuse treatment or choose treatment options.. So repeatedly, the Committee exhibits an acute awareness of the abuse of civil rights going on in the mental health system and of the general lack of self-determination over treatment options that most mental patients have.. Yet, despite their oft-stated intent of helping empower patients in their own recoveries, the Committee repeatedly avoids actually tackling this problem directly or recommending any kind of reforms with regard to involuntary treatment laws.. Senator Michael Kirby later admitted in a news article that the issue of the rights of ordinary mental patients to refuse treatment was not dealt with in the Final Report because the Committee considered it "wildly controversial" (.. Wipond, 2006.. Unfortunately, even this vitally important point was not publicly admitted in the Final Report, let alone discussed anywhere in it.. It is a truly stunning abdication of responsibility for dealing with what is, arguably, the single most important and influential issue in how Canada's mental health care system serves and disserves patients.. How can we speak meaningfully of “empowering patients” and of creating a “patient-centred” mental health system, so long as these patients’ disempowerment is inscribed into law?.. The Committee's choice to ignore this crucial issue is all the more concerning in light of what they do recommend.. The Final Report strongly endorses a wide-ranging expansion of mental health services, recommending that mental health professionals be involved in more workplace interventions, more daycare and school interventions, more outreach to the elderly, “telemental health” initiatives etc.. And this is done with absolutely no discussion about the prominent role forced treatment plays in Canada's current mental health system and the resulting potential dangers of such an expansion for the civil rights of average Canadians.. In the final analysis, then, Out of the Shadows at Last" is nothing more than an utterly unscientific, propagandistic template for indefinite increases of funding to mental health professionals, and for an unprecedented assault on civil rights in Canada.. Unfortunately, the Committee thereby missed an extraordinary opportunity to foster more balanced and sophisticated discussions and point the direction towards better solutions.. For example, in 2002 Canada's Yukon Territory overhauled its.. , and tightened rather than broadened the criteria allowing involuntary treatment, focusing more limitedly on only those people with a mental disorder who were in clearly imminent danger of causing or experiencing "serious bodily harm" (.. Yukon Territory, 2002.. 5(1)).. At the same time, in the.. Care Consent Act.. Yukon Territory, 2003.. ), a plethora of tools were created to encourage and facilitate the process of individuals developing their own advance directives for mental health care in conjunction with care providers, choosing substitute decision makers, and employing new guardianship provisions to help maintain control over certain aspects of their lives even if having to temporarily forfeit control over other aspects.. While this still leaves the question as to whether forced psychiatric treatment is necessary where incarceration alone would achieve the same stated goals of physical protection, at least in this model the protection of individual civil rights is going in the direction of a more reasonable balance against the augmentation of state interventions.. Allan, F.. Witness Testimony.. Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.. parl.. gc.. ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/soci-e/18cv-e.. htm?Language=EandParl=38andSes=1andcomm_id=47.. British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.. (1964).. Report on civil liberties and mental health legislation.. bccla.. org/positions/patients/64mentalhealth.. (1976).. Civil committal and release.. org/positions/patients/76committal.. Sterilization: Implications for mentally retarded and mentally ill persons.. org/positions/patients/83sterilization.. Canadian Mental Health Association-British Columbia Division.. Submission to Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology regarding Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addictions.. cmha.. bc.. ca/files/kirbyreport.. pdf.. Carten, R.. P.. roceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.. ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/soci-e/18evb-e.. Chambers, J.. ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/soci-e/05evb-e.. Hall, N.. ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/soci-e/16eva-e.. htm?Language=EandParl=37andSes=2andcomm_id=47.. Kupfer, D.. , First, M.. and Regier, D.. A Research Agenda for DSM-V.. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.. appi.. org/book.. cfm?id=2292.. LeBlanc, E.. ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/soci-e/15eve-e.. Macnaughton, E.. The BC Early Intervention Study: Report of Findings.. Canadian Mental Health Association -- British Columbia Division.. ca/files/ei_fin.. Marshall, M and Rathbone J.. Early Intervention for psychosis.. Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews,.. cochrane.. org/reviews/en/ab004718.. Mental Health Commission of Canada.. MHC Applauds Ottawa's Increased Support for Improving Mental Health in Canada.. mentalhealthcommission.. ca/English/News/Pages/August182008.. aspx.. Milloy, S.. (2001).. Medical Journals Hooked on Drug Money.. foxnews.. com/story/0,2933,31761,00.. Fox News.. Ombudsman of the Province of British Columbia.. Listening: A Review of Riverview Hospital.. ombud.. gov.. ca/resources/reports/Public_Reports/Public%20Report%20No%20-%2033.. Public Report No.. 33.. Province of British Columbia.. O'Neill, J.. and Fishcher, D.. Fighting for the Right to Refuse Treatment: Part 1.. The Ottawa Citizen.. canada.. com/ottawa/ottawacitizen/news/story.. html?id=7cd24be1-efb7-41b6-9511-54e1f8e27524.. qp.. ca/statreg/stat/m/96288_01.. Province of Manitoba.. http://web2.. mb.. ca/laws/statutes/ccsm/m110e.. php.. Province of New Brunswick.. (1973).. canlii.. org/nb/laws/sta/m-10/20080818/whole.. Province of Ontario.. e-laws.. on.. ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_90m07_e.. Schizophrenia Society of Canada.. Position Paper: Early Intervention in Schizophrenia.. Sklar, R.. Starson v.. Swayze: The Supreme Court Speaks Out (Not all That Clearly) on the Question of “Capacity”.. The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry.. http://209.. 85.. 173.. 104/search?q=cache:mgHQTvh8GiYJ:publications.. cpa-apc.. org/media.. php%3Fmid%3D411+what+does+the+starson+case+mean%3Fandhl=enandct=clnkandcd=4.. , Vol.. 52, No.. 6, p.. 390-396.. Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology.. Reports on the Study of the Health Care System in Canada.. Volumes 1-6.. ca/common/Committee_SenRep.. asp?Language=Eandparl=37andSes=2andcomm_id=47.. (2004a).. Interim Report 1-.. Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction: Overview of Policies and Programs in Canada.. ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/soci-e/rep-e/repintnov04-e.. (2004b).. Interim Report 3-.. Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction: Issues and Options for Canada.. Out of the Shadows at Last -- Transforming Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction Services in Canada.. ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/soci-e/rep-e/rep02may06-e.. Supreme Court of British Columbia.. Mullins v.. Levy.. Docket C982449.. courts.. ca/jdb-txt/sc/06/07/2006bcsc0753.. Supreme Court of Canada.. Swayze.. org/en/ca/scc/doc/2003/2003scc32/2003scc32.. Docket 28799.. Wipond, R.. (1998a).. The Mad Movement.. Monday Magazine.. Victoria, British Columbia: Monday Publications.. (1998b).. Big, Scary New Laws.. Let There Be Pills For All.. Rabble.. rabble.. ca/news.. shtml?x=51180.. World Fellowship for Schizophrenia and Allied Disorders.. Our People: Board of Directors.. world-schizophrenia.. org/wfsad/people.. Yukon Territory.. yk.. ca/legislation/acts/mehe.. hss.. ca/programs/decision_making/care_consent_act/.. Biographical Note:.. Rob Wipond is a professional freelance researcher, writer and journalist who specializes in mental health issues.. He made a personal presentation expressing concerns about psychiatric science and involuntary psychiatric treatment to the Standing Senate Committee in 2005.. For more information:.. robwipond..

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